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ABSTRACT
In 1984, despite twenty years of equal employment
policies and improved educational training women working on
a full-time, year-round basis continue to earn roughly sixty
percent of the wages earned by men. At the same time women
work primarily in sex-segregated occupations. Recent
research shows a significant correlation between these two
phenomena. Comparable worth has emerged as one policy tool
to eliminate that part of the wage gap due to sex-based wage
discrimination.
This thesis investigates the theoretical basis and
historical background for a comparable worth policy and
explores how this policy has been implemented. Trade
unions, women's groups and some state and local governments
have promoted comparable worth primarily in the public
sector through collective bargaining and legislation.
Legislation can effect a broad range of job categories.
The legislative approach relies on the efforts of elected
officials, and therefore, is vulnerable to political shifts
in the government. The collective bargaining approach
involves a higher degree of worker participation, and
depends more on the strength of unions at the bargaining
table. Regardless of method, comparable worth has
effectively raised the wages for workers in underpaid
female-dominated jobs. Research shows, however, that
comparable worth has been limited in its scope and in its
ability to fully identify sex-bias in wage setting
practices. Still the achievement of comparable worth can
alter the economic status of women and begin to challenge
prevailing cultural attitudes which undervalue "women's
work".
Thesis Supervisor: J. Mark Davidson Schuster
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"If anyone vows the value of a person and wishes
to discharge the vow: a man shall be valued at
fifty shekels... a women shall be valued at
thirty shekels."
-- Leviticus 27:3-4
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION
Comparable worth has become one of the most talked
about and debated public policy issues in the United States.
Trade unions have made it one of their top bargaining
issues; seminars for management personnel teach how firms
can avoid this "human resource trap;" the former director of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission called it the
"civil rights issue of the eighties;" and a federal judge
claimed it is "pregnant (sic) with the possibility of
disrupting the entire economic system of the United States"
(Feldberg, 1985). Comparable worth was an issue in the 1984
presidential campaign with the Democrats strongly supporting
it, and the Reagan administration refusing to take an
official stand but calling it "a nebulous idea at best".
(New York Times, 1984). What is comparable worth? Why
does it evoke such strong reaction?
Comparable worth is a policy which seeks to eliminate
that portion of the wage gap between men and women that can
be attributed to sex-based wage discrimination, i.e., that
which occurs when the sex composition of job incumbents
influences what an employer is willing to pay those who do
the jobs. Rejecting a system which places a lower value,
and, consequently, a lower wage, on the work done by women,
comparable worth advocates demand that jobs requiring
comparable skill, effort, responsibility and working
conditions be equally compensated. By challenging the
systematic undervaluation of women's work, i.e. the
artifical depression of women's wages relative to the wages
that would be paid if the jobs were done primarily by men,
comparable worth addresses a type of discrimination thus far
unchallenged by existing equal employment policies.
Comparable worth differs from the idea of equal pay for
equal work because it recognizes that men and women work in
different occupations. It differs from affirmative action
programs because the goal of comparable worth is not to move
women out of their current professions but to increase the
wages of the "undervalued" work they are already doing.
In 1984, despite twenty years of equal employment
policies, a woman working on a full-time, year-round basis
earned approximately 64 cents for every dollar earned by a
man (Smith and Ward, 1984., p. xiii). At the same time, the
labor market continued to exhibit a high level of
segregation by sex with men and women employed in different
occupations. According to one study, two-thirds of all
employed men and women would have to change jobs in order
for their distribution across occupations to be similar.
(Steinberg, 1984, p.4). In 1981, a major study by the
National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council
(NAS/NRC) concluded that men and women not only do different
jobs, but that occupational segregation accounts for a
substantial part of the wage gap. In fact, they found that
"the more an occupation is dominated by women, the less it
pays." (Treiman and Hartmann, 1981, p. 28). While part of
the wage differential can be attributed to education and
training differences between men and women, there is is an
unexplained wage differential that is due at least in part
to the fact that the jobs are done primarily by women.
In the last decade the idea of comparable worth has
been translated into policy in a variety of ways. More than
30 states and over 100 localities have begun to address the
problem of the wage gap among public employees. And
pressure is mounting on private sector employers to address
the issue as well. Advocates have raised the issue through
public education, collective bargaining, and litigation
resulting in comparable worth legislation, collective
bargaining agreements that include "comparable worth" wage
adjustments, and litigation over the validity of the
comparable worth claim. Workers are beginning to let
employers know that sex-based wage discrimination will no
longer be tolerated. In a recent poll conducted by the
National Committee on Pay Equity (NCPE), a coalition of
labor unions and women's and civil rights groups working for
comparable worth, 83% of the workers questioned supported
the concept of comparable worth as one way of closing the
wage gap. (NY Times, February 14, 1985).
The fight for comparable worth policies has evoked
widespread controversy and ardent opposition. Comparable
worth challenges one of the basic value systems in our
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culture: the way in which compensation is determined and
value is assigned to work. As Helen Remick explains:
"Most men use their earnings as a primary measure
of their self-worth; women tend to use other
measures because by this measure they are nearly
worthless and certainly worth less. A proposal to
alter fundamentally the manner in which wages are
assigned is therefore likely to arouse some emotion
in virtually everyone." (Remick, 1984, p. x).
By challenging prevailing cultural ideas about the
relative value of different work activities, comparable
worth raises many uncomfortable questions for employers.
Arguing that comparable worth is not grounded in any legal
rationale, employers have strongly resisted most comparable
worth activities. (Livernash, 1980; BNA, 1984). Critics of
comparable worth contend that it will destroy the free
market as the basic mechanism for setting wages. Comparable
worth does not, however, dismiss the importance of the
market for setting wages; rather, it requires employers to
pay fair market wages to women. Wages rates should be based
on the content of jobs, not on the characteristics of
workers. Comparable worth calls for removal of
discrimination from the market, not the destruction of it.
In the past, employers have used these same arguments to
oppose other labor market reforms which seek to reinterpret
compensation practices (e.g. the fight for a minimum wage
law and an eight hour day). (Madison, 1983; Steinberg,
1984).
Opponents of comparable worth also argue that it is
impossible to compare dissimilar jobs because it is like
comparing apples and oranges. Yet, Remick and Steinberg
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(1984) point out:
"Of course, any particular apple may not be
equal to any particular orange, nor are all apples
identical. Yet, there are general characteristics
of fruit, such as the number of calories, the
vitamin content, and so on, that make it possible
to compare specific apples with specific
oranges. Along some dimensions of comparison, the
apples and oranges compared may, in fact, be
equivalent, and therefore of equal value. Likewise
certain dissimilar jobs may comprise functional
tasks and characteristics that, from the employers
point of view, are equivalent in value." (p.288).
Finally, critics charge that implementing comparable
worth will be too costly to employers. While proponents do
not deny that comparable worth adjustments may be costly,
cost is no justification for letting discrimination
continue. No one has argued that all wage discrimination be
ended all at once. As with other labor market reforms, such
as Title VII and the minimum wage laws, comparable worth is
usually implemented in phases. Spreading the costs out over
time can reduce the fiscal impact. Initial adjustments
usually represent only a small fraction of an employer's
total wage bill. (Remick and Steinberg, 1984, p.290; Cook,
1984, p.280).
As comparable worth activities proliferate around the
country the controversy has gained national attention.
Clarence Pendleton, chairperson of the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission, recently called comparable worth "the looniest
idea since Looney Tunes." (NY Times, date). This opposition
from the present administration and from many employers has
not altered the determination of trade unions, women's
groups, and some state and local governments to put an end
to sex-based discrimination in wage setting practices.
Rather it has shifted the locus of activity from the federal
legislative and judicial arena to state and local
legislation and the collective bargaining arena.
My thesis will investigate how the implementation of
comparable worth has been achieved. Chapter Two will look
at the theoretical and historical background of comparable
worth, specifically investigating the explanations for the
existence of the wage gap, theories of wage and employment
discrimination, the link between the wage gap and
occupational segregation, and how a policy of pay equity
based on the principle of equal pay for work of comparable
value addresses discrimination in wage setting practices
that has thus far not been addressed by other equal
employment policies. I focus specifically on sex
discrimination. Although race discrimination in wage
setting exists, the wage gap between men and women is
larger, and the extent of occupational segregation greater,
than that between minorities and non-minorites. Comparable
worth policy can also serve as a basis for correcting race-
based discrimnation. In Chapter Three, I look at several
case studies of comparable worth implementation. The cases
illustrate how implementation is affected by the existing
procedure for setting wages, by the degree of support for
the comparable worth policy on the part of both the
employees and management, and by the political context in
which the events take place.
7
Chapter Four will analyze the case studies to see how
the implementation of comparable worth challenges existing
procedures for setting wages. Specifically, I will discuss
how achieving comparable worth through collective bargaining
differs from achieving it through legislation and how the
political contexts of each shapes the process for
questioning wage setting practices, i.e., how strong union
support and the level of management cooperation affect the
amount and type of wage supplement awarded; how it affects
the mechanisms established to insure that comparable worth
is achieved. Chapter Five will consider the limitations of
comparable wroth policy as it has thus far been applied; and
explore what steps must be taken to insure that
discrimination will not reenter the wage setting process.
Chapter Six will summarize the findings of this thesis.
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Chapter 2: THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF
COMPARA~BLE WORTH
The most significant change in the United States labor
market since the end of World War II has been the dramatic
increase in both the number and the proportion of women
workers. In 1950, roughly 33% of adult women were in the
workforce. representing only 27% of all workers. By 1980,
more than 50% of all women worked outside the home,
accounting for 43% of the workforce. (Blau. 1984). Yet,
over a period of time during which women have entered the
workplace in record numbers, the earnings ratio between men
and women has remained relatively constant. Over the last
forty years it has fluctuated around sixty percent. See
Table 1). What causes the wage gap? Why has it remained
unchanged?
Two different sets of explanations have been offered as
to why this differential between the earnings of men and
women persists. The first argues that pay differences are
due to the characteristics of workers. The second set
focuses on characteristics of lgbs.
The "worker characteristic" (supply-side) theories draw
upon the neoclassical economic theory of wages. Starting
with the concept that individuals are compensated based on
their relative productivity, human capital theories posit
that investments in individual productive skills earn
certain payoffs in the labor market. In the absence of
9
TABLE 1
Comparison of Median Earnings of
Year-Round, Full-Time Workers
By Sex, Selected Years, 1939-1981
Median Earnings
Women's Earnings As
Year Women Men A Ratio of Men's
1981 $12,001 $20,260 59.2%
1980 11,197 18,612 60.2%
1979 10,151 17,014 59.7%
1978 9,350 15,730 59.4%
1977 8,618 14,626 58.9%
1976 8,099 13,455 60.2%
1975 7,504 12,758 58.6%
1974 6,772 11,835 57.2%
1973 6,335 11,186 56.6%
1972 5,903 10,202 57.9%
1971 5,593 9,399 59.5%
1970 5,323 8,966 59.4%
1969 4,977 8,227 60.5%
1968 4,457 7,664 58.2%
1967 4,150 7,182 57.8%
1966 3,973 6,848 58.0%
1965 3,823 6,375 60.0%
1964 3,690 6,195 59.6%
1963 3,561 5,978 59.6%
1962 3,446 5,974 57.7%
1961 3,351 5,644 59.4%
1960 3,293 5,317 61.9%
1959 3,193 5,209 61.3%
1958 3,102 4,927 63.0%
1957 3,008 4,713 63.8%
1956 2,827 4,466 63.3%
1955 2,719 4,252 63.9%
1946 1,710 2,588 66.1%
1939 863 1,356 63.6%
Source: National Committee on Pay Equity, "The Wage Gap:
Myth and Facts," (NCPE): Washington, D.C.,
1983, p. 2 .
1 C)
discrimination, a worker is paid based on his or her
economic contribution to the firm (i.e. their marginal
productivity). Because a worker's marginal product is
difficult to measure empirically, human captial theories
have looked at differences in workers' productivity
characteristics instead. If women earn less than men, it is
because on average they have fewer years of formal education
and training than men a result of from their decision to
invest less time than men in their education and training.
Women's lack of skills makes them less productive and hence,
less well paid. (Blau, 1984; Stevenson, 1978; England, 1984;
Treiman and Hartmann, 1981).
In an extension of the human capital theory, Polchak
argues that acquired human capital may depreciate over time
from non-use. Therefore, women earn less than men because
they interrupt their careers for childrearing and
homemaking, which lessens their seniority and deteriorates
their productivity, resulting in lower paychecks. (England,
1984). Motivated by economic choice, women will choose to
acquire skills that do not depreciate rapidly from non-use
and subsequently will choose to enter jobs in which wages
are not dependent upon the continuous accumulation of
skills.
Empirically, human capital theories cannot entirely
account for the persistence of the wage differential between
men and women. Various studies (Stevenson, 1978; England,
1984) show that although the education gap between men and
women has virtually been eliminated, significant pay
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differentials persist. In 1981, a woman with a college
degree earns an average of $2000 less per year than a male
high school drop-out (NCPE, 1964;) (See Table 2).
Furthermore, in reviewing twenty-one major studies on the
male-female earnings gap, Lloyd and Niemi (1979) found that
variables influencing worker productivity and
characteristics usually accounted for less than 25% and
never more than 50% of the earnings differential, the
residual being attributed to discrimination.
The second set of explanations about the existence of
the wage gap focusses on job characteristics. Recognizing
that different jobs require different skills and
responsibilities, it is expected that earnings will differ
among jobs. It may be that women are in jobs that require
less skill, effort and responsibility. The difference in
pay between men and women would then legitimately be based
on differences in "productivity-related job content
characteristics." (Steinberg, 1984, p.17). However, these
job content differences can account for some, but never all,
of the intra-occupational differences in pay. (Treiman and
Hartmann, 1981).
While these theories address why jobs may be rewarded
differently, they do not address the question of why men and
women tend to work in different types of jobs. The NAS/NRC
study found that the single biggest reason women earn less
than men is that, overwhelmingly, women and men do not work
in the same jobs. Rather, women work in a narrow set of
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TABLE 2
Median Annual Earnings of Full-Time Wage
And Salary Workers* By Education, 1981
Level of Education Men Women
8 years or less $13,468 $ 6,788
1 to 3 years of high school
4 years high school
1 to 3 years of college
4 years of college
16, 328
18.,876
20,696
23, 868
5 or more years of college 26,364 18,824
* Excludes part-time workers and the self-employed.
Source: Helen Remick, "Comparable Worth: Economic Equity
for Women". Manoa, HI: Industrial Relations Center,
1984, p.3
9, 724
11,544
13,468
15,548
sex-segregated occupations (occupations in which at least
70% of the incumbents are of one sex). In 1982, more than
80% of women employees worked in only 20 of the 427 detailed
occupations listed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(Madison, 1983, p.6). In comparison, men were much more
evenly distributed among more than 300 occupations (Gold.,
p.6); less than 20% of men were employed in the ten largest
male-dominated occupations. (Grune, 1984).
Recent work shows that over the last four decades the
degree of occupational segregation, like the wage gap, has
remained substantially unchanged. From 1950 to 1979, the
percentage of women in sex-segregated occupations (over 85%
single sex) has actually increased from 35.7% to 46.3%
(Burris and Wharton, 1982). In fact, more than 80% of women
working outside the home were in occupations which were 75%
female, and 22% were in jobs which were 95% female. (NCPE,
1983, p.5) Today, a woman is actually more likely to be
doing some type of "women's" work than a woman working in
1950. In 1950, one out of every four working women was a
clerical worker; by 1980, that figure had grown to one out
of every three.
Women are not only confined to different jobs, but they
get paid less for their work. The NAS/NRC study, completed
in 1981, concluded that the more an occupation is dominated
by women, the less it pays. (Treiman and Hartmann, 1981).
Neither the personal characteristics of the employees nor
the difference in job requirements can explain the extent of
the relationship between sexual composition of occupations
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and the earnings of job incumbents. In fact, the sex of the
worker doing a job is the single best indicator of the
compensation of that job. (Remick, 1984; Treiman and
Hartmann, 1981). What accounts for these phenomena? How do
economists explain the apparent discrimination against women
in the labor market?
The Wage gag. OccUgational Seg egAt ion.L and Discrimination
The facts that the wage gap exists and that the labor
market exhibits a high level of occupational segregation by
sex are undisputed. Rather, the controversy surrounds the
critical question: how much is the wage gap and occupational
segregation due to women's choice of jobs, their restriction
to low paying jobs, or the underpayment of some jobs because
they tend to be held by women? Comparable worth advocates
charge that the wage gap exists primarily because of wage
discrimination against women. What does the empirical
evidence tell us?
The first explanation is that women voluntarily choose
certain occupations despite the fact that such jobs are
relatively low paid. This preference for low paid work is
attributed to a variety of reasons, among them:
socialization (belief that only certain occupations are
appropriate for women); education (lack of training or
skills reduces job alternatives); lack of information; and
conscious decisions to forego certain occupations in order
to be able to fulfill the dual demands of work and family.
While it is difficult to assess the impact of choices,
15
because choices may be adaptations to constraints rather
than choices between alternatives, empirical studies have
attempted to measure the role of choice in determining
women's position in the labor market by looking at the
relationship between wages and continuity of work
experience. The hypothesis was made that if women's skills
depreciate over time due to the interruptions in their labor
force participation, this would correlate with lower wages.
In reviewing several studies (Mincer and Polchak, 1974;
England, 1962; and Corcoran, 1979) Treiman and Hartmann
(1981) found the results rather inconclusive. Certainly,
the role of choice affects the distribution of women across
occupations, but choice alone cannot explain the extent of
the occupational segregation found in the labor market.
(Treiman and Hartman, 1981, p.53-54).
The two other explanations of women's concentration in low
payi-ng occupations--exclusion from particular jobs and
undervaluation of women's work--constitute different forms
of employment and wage discrimination. Employment
discrimination occurs when one class of workers is denied
access to higher paying jobs solely or partly on the basis
of sex, race, religion, or ethnic origin. Wage
discrimination occurs when one group of employees is paid
less than another for reasons unrelated to the work
performed. There are two types of wage discrimination. One
is when two workers performing the same work are paid
differently; the other type is relatively harder to detect
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and occurs when the job structure within a firm is
substantially segregated by race or sex of the workers and
the workers in one category are paid less than those in the
other although the work performed is comparable based on job
requirements. (Ibid, p. 9).
Exclusion occurs when employment or promotional
opportunities are restricted to certain workers based on
their race, sex, religion, or another social characteristic.
Neoclassical economists offer several employment
discrimination theories. One theory argues that some
employers simply have a preference or "taste" for certain
employees which are not economically motivated, and are
willing to pay more to hire a particular group of workers,
in this case, men. Statistical discrimination occurs when
employers prefer to hire members of a particular group of
workers because of prevailing stereotypes about this group
that may or may not apply to the particular worker in
question. The "crowding" theory states that women are
denied access to high paying jobs, and instead "crowded"
into certain occupations, creating an oversupply of labor.
The separation of the sexes increases their productivity
differences. Productivity differences together with an
oversupply of women workers holds women's wages artificially
low. (Blau, 1984; England, 1984; Stevenson, 1978; Wallace,
1982).
Radical theorists argue that the segregation of the
workforce is a result of a segmented labor market wherein
job characteristics and industrial structure combine to
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funnel women into low paying, secondary jobs. Jobs in the
primary market are characterized by high pay, stability,
high skill level, and occupational mobility; secondary jobs,
where women are concentrated, lack these qualities.
Movement betwen the two tiers is virtually non-existent.
This dual labor market in which jobs and workers are divided
into distinct categories increases the power of employers by
providing them with a low wage workforce and preventing
worker solidarity through the artificial division of workers
along sex and race lines. (For further discussions see
Stevenson, 1978; Gordon, Edwards, Reich, 1962; England,
1984).
Treiman and Hartmann (1981) reviewed several empirical
studies (Schlei and Grossman; Malkiel and Malkiel) that
sought to document employment and discrimination patterns
within firms. They concluded that although it is often
difficult to detect employment discrimination, disparate
treatment of men and women in job assignment, promotion,
etc., based on their sex does exist. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 outlawed this type of behavior, making it
illegal for an employer to discriminate in any employment
practice--hiring, firing, promotion-, job assignment or
compensation--based on the sex, race, religion, or ethnic
origin of an employee. Still, such conduct has not been
eradicated.
The other explanation of lower pay rates for women is
that women's work is underpaid because it is done primarily
by women. When the work done by men and women is
substantially similar, the discrepancy in pay is easier to
detect, although there still remains the legal question of
how similar jobs must be to be considered "equal". The
Equal Pay Act, passed in 1963, made it illegal to pay
different wages to men and women performing substantially
similar work. Identifying differences in pay rates when
jobs performed are substantially different in effort, skill,
responsibility, and task content is harder to detect.
Comparable worth policy is designed to eliminate such
practices. While the empirical evidence is limited, there
are several documented cases where job evaluation procedures
were examined and it was found that the sex composition of
the workforce influenced the pay rate. (See War Labor Board
case (Newman, 1976); Washington State study (Remick, 1980)).
For example, a 1972 case against General Electric
demonstrates how an employer violated its own criteria for
determining relative pay rates and was found guilty of
intentional sex-based wage discrimination. In a lawsuit,
the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers (IUE) was able to show that the wage rates for men's
and women's jobs were set by the same job evaluation method
and despite similar ratings the highest wage rate for
women's jobs was below the lowest rate for men's jobs
(Treiman and Hartman, 1981, p.58-60; Newman, 1976, p.270).
In reviewing the evidence on the link between job
segregation and wage differentials, the NAS/NRC study
concluded that theories focusing on women's choice of low
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paying jobs and their exclusion from high paying jobs fail
to fully explain the extent of the wage gap. THe
undervaluation of work because it is primarily done by women
accounted for a substantial part of the observed wage gap:
"The committee is convinced by the evidence... that
women are systematically underpaid... [and3 that the
strategy of 'comparable worth' merits consideration as
an alternative policy intervention in the paysetting
process." (Ibid, p.66)
Job Evaluation and its Role in ComaaCable Worth
Theories of occupational segregation and discrimination
attempt to explain why men and women work in different jobs
and why the pay differential between those jobs persists,
yet they do not explain how wages are set within the firm.
Comparable worth seeks to end sex-based discrimination in
wage setting at the firm level, thus it is important to
understnad copensation procedures.Historically, employers
have kept their systems for allocating wages secret (Beatty
and Beatty, 1984, p. 59). Traditionally however, employers
have relied upon some type of job evaluation plan to
determine the relative worth or value of each job with an
organization. Comparisons with market wages are then used
to set pay levels.
Job evaluation systems are a hundred year old
management tool used to evaluate and assess jobs.
(Steinberg, 1984, p.19) Today it is estimated that 65'4 of
employers in the public and private sector use some type of
job evaluation plan (Walker and Grune, 1984, p.1).
Employers who do not have formal plans use market prices for
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certain "key" jobs to peg the wages of related jobs in the
firm and, thereby, develop internal hierarchies without
evaluating job content.
More systematic job evaluation plans commonly involve a
two part process: first, job content is analyzed and
described so that jobs can be ordered or placed within an
internal job hierarchy. Then wages are assigned to jobs.
Most often employers determine internal salary ranges
through external valuing, i.e. employers survey salaries
with same job families at other firms in order to determine
the "prevailing wage." Usually there is no attempt to
adjust wages among job families to establish equity. Such
differences are considered by some to be acceptable
reflections of market forces of supply and demand (Remick,
1980, p.406; Beatty and Beatty, 1984).
There are several methods of job evaluation used to
determine internal job hierarchy and wage structures. The
simplest one is job ranking. Jobs are ranked on the basis
of overall worth or value to an organization. There is no
breakdown of job content. Another method, the
classification system, was originally developed by the
federal government for civil service jobs. This process
involves first establishing a number of pay grades or jobs
classes. Broad descriptions are then written for the types
of jobs which fit in each grade. Individual job
descriptions are compared to the grades' descriptions and
assigned accordingly. Ranking and classification systems
are considered non-quantitative evaluation methods because
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they do not produce precise scores for each job; rather
employer's assess a job's overall value and determine a
position for each job within the firm's hierarchy.
The point factor method is a quantitative approach to
job evaluation in which the various segments of a job are
analyzed to produce a job "score." This method provides
explicit criteria for rating job factors. Although point
factor systems vary, most share a common process: jobs are
described; descriptions are rated based on "comparable"
factors--usually effort, skill, responsibility, and working
conditions. These ratings are added to create a job score;
and scores are used to assign jobs to pay classes.
Traditionally assumed to be fair and neutral, the use
of job evaluation may reinforce patterns of sex-bias and can
be discriminatory in several ways. (Remick, 1984, p.99).
First, an employer may use more than one evaluation plan to
assess all jobs within the firm (i.e. one for the shop
workers, another for office workers, another for management
personnel). If this occurs, dissimilar jobs may be
evaluated based on different techniques and never compared
to one another. Due to the extreme sex segregation of the
workforce, the use of separate evaluation plans could serve
to reinforce the undervaluation of female-typed jobs.
Second, even if the same system is used on a firm-wide
basis, job evaluation would still incorporate cultural and
personal bias. The job evaluation process is based on the
subjective judgements of those who rate the jobs. Employers
who stereotype workers may place considerable value on a
job, but the identification of women with its performance
may lower the jobs rating relative to jobs done
predominantly by men.
Finally, the factors used in evaluation may reflect and
reinforce sex biases in the market. For example, the
lifting of heavy boxes, a task done in many male-dominated
jobs, is usually considered more difficult and therefore
worthy of greater value (i.e., given more points) than the
lifting of people, a task required of many female-dominated
occupations, such as nursing. Furthermore, certain skills
may go unrecognized. Skills such as guidance and
nurturing--often thought to be intrinsic skills of women
rather than skills required to perform certain jobs--may not
be formally included in job descriptions. For example, the
Dictionary of cggugational Titles (DOT) rated zookeepers
higher than daycare workers. Researchers found that DOT
overlooked many job characteristics of female-dominated
jobs, confusing job content with employee characteristics.
(Steinberg, 1984, p.23; Treiman and Hartmann, 1981).
Despite the limitations of job evaluation methods,
these plans do provide a systematic method for comparing
jobs and analyzing whether jobs of comparable worth to
employers are being consistently compensated. Indeed, these
methods have played a pivotal role in implementing
comparable worth in the wage structure of firms and winning
compensation for women in highly-segregated undervalued
occupations. As a technique used to identify sex-bias in
wage setting, job evaluation must fill two roles:
"First it must determine whether the salaries
associated with female-dominated job titles
accurately reflect an explicit and consistently
applied standard of value or whether they are
artificially depressed because women fill the jobs.
Second, it must pinpoint job titles that may be
undervalued and then develop estimates of potential
costs of correcting for this wage discrimination."
(Steinberg, 1984, p.19)
One aim of comparable worth policy is to eliminate
discrimination in wage setting through the consistent
application of a particular job evaluation system to all
jobs in an establishment; a second is to change the choice
and valuation of compensable factors to adjust for sex-
biases in the assessment of job content. Because job
evaluation systems are unscientific, they are fairly
vulnerable to criticisms; it is difficult to actually
validate that they measure what they say they do. Despite
their drawbacks, they can be used to systematically assess
jobs to see if they are being fairly compensated relative to
other jobs within a firm. (Verma and Wallace, 1982). In
most comparable worth cases, the point factor system has
been used to critique existing job evaluation systems. The
point factor method is used most often because its criteria
are explicit and it is relatively easy to use, and hence, it
may be more reliable. (Beatty and Beatty, 1984). While the
quantification of this method may make it less subjective,
it is still subject to the problems outlined above.
Job evaluation studies have served as the base for more
than two dozen comparable worth claims. (Steinberg, p.21).
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Despite differences in evaluation techniques, these studies
consistently arrived at the same conclusion: predominately
female jobs are paid less than predominately male jobs of
comparable worth to the employer. Table 3 summarizes the
findings of three separate studies done in Minnesota, San
Jose, and Washington State.
History of Com2arable Worth As Policy
The policy of comparable worth has evolved as one way
to rectify the sex discrimination that results from the link
between the wage gap and occupational segregation (Remick,
1984b). By calling for equal pay for work of equal value,
comparable worth advocates are rejecting a system which
places a lower value on and, consequently, pays a lower wage
for, work done by women. Comparable worth demands the
remuneration of work based on the relative value of the work
to an employer, regardless of employee characteristics.
(Feldberg, 1984; NCPE, 1983). The underlying principle is
that jobs valued equally by an employer should be
compensated on an equal basis. As with other equal
employment policies, the focus is on correcting
discrimination at the firm level. Comparable worth is
specifically concerned with eliminating sex-bias within a
firm's compensation system; it does not address problems of
wage differences due to employemnt in diffrent firms.
Although it may seem to be a relatively recent
concept, the idea of comparable worth in wage setting has
been raised and fought over before. Comparable worth policy
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TABLE 3
Comparison of Worth and Salary of
Selected Jobs From Job Evaluation Studies
MONTHLY NUMBER
JOB TITLE SALARY OF POINTS
MINNESOTA
Registerd Nurse (F) $1723 275
Vocational Ed. Teacher (M) 2260 275
Health Program Rep. (F) 1590 238
Steam Boiler Attendant (M) 1611 156
Data Processing Coord. (F) 1423 199
General Repair Work (M) 1564 134
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA
Librarian I (F) 750 288
Street Sweeper Op. (M) 758 124
Senior Legal Secretary (F) 665 226
Senior Carpenter (M) 1040 226
Senior Accounting Clerk (F) 638 210
Senior Painter (M) 1040 210
WASHINGTON
Registerd Nurse (F) 1368 348
Highway Engineer 3 (M) 1980 345
Laundry Worker (F) 884 105
Truck Driver (M) 1493 97
Secretary (F) 1122 197
Maintenance Carpenter (M) 1707 197
*Points and salaries are not comparable across studies.
Source: National Committee on Pay Equity, "The Wage Gap:
Myth and Facts." (NCPE): Washington, D.C., 1983,
p. 5.
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has evolved over the past sixty years primarily as an
outgrowth of equal employment policy. The first stage of
development involved the passage of state legislation and
National War Labor Board Orders. More recently, comparable
worth activities have been set into motion by several
federal laws and regulations. (Steinberg, 1984; Dean,
et.al., 1984).
The early history of pay equity focussed on the policy
of equal pay for equal work, a demand which was articulated
during the early part of the century among trade unions and
women's rights groups. It was not until World War II,
however, that the issue received widespread attention. At
that time, as women moved into the workforce in large
numbers to replace the men, several eastern states passed
legislation prohibiting sex-based wage discrimination and
the National War Labor Board heard thousands of equal pay
complaints. (Steinberg, 1984; Blumrosen, 1979).
The first national-level case to challenge sex-based
wage discrimination came during World War II. A 1945 case
before the War Labor Board established that despite
professionally evaluating jobs within their plants to
determine level of skill, effort and responsibility, General
Electric used separate scales one for men and one for women
by which to set wages for all jobs. On average, wages for
women's jobs were one third lower than men's jobs, although
General Electric's own evaluation system showed the jobs
were comparable in terms of evaluation points. In fact, the
highest paid female job was paid less than the lowest grade
men's job. In a similar case, Westinghouse Electric paid
women's jobs 18-20% less than "comparable" men's jobs. As a
result of these findings, the War Labor Board granted an
exception to the national emergency wage freeze, ruling that
women's wages should be paid in accordance with value of job
worth and not on basis of sex of employee. (Newman, 1976, p.
527; Treiman and Hartmann).
Following World War II, efforts to end wage
discrimination focussed primarily on the call for equal
wages for equal work. In the 1940's and 1950's, attempts to
get national legislation mandating equal pay for equal work
failed, due in part to anti-union backlash. (Steinberg,
1964). A decade later in 1963, the U.S. Congress finally
passed the Equal Pay Act, which prohibits employers from
paying different wages to men and women performing the same
work.
Although the comparable worth standard was part of the
original Equal Pay bill, it was deleted from the final bill
after lengthy debate in Congress. Consequently, the Act
stopped short of mandating comparable worth, calling instead
for equal pay for men and women doing the same work. In
interpreting the Equal Pay Act, the courts have ordered that
only jobs with substantially similar content, i.e. a nurse's
aide and an orderly, must be compensated on the same basis.
By the late 1970's, the wage gap remained essentially
unchanged. The Equal Pay Act only addressed wage
discrimination in jobs with overlapping requirements. It
offered no specific provisions for jobs with dissimilar
content and, therefore, did not affect the vast majority of
women who continued to work in occupations that were
overwhelmingly female-dominated and substantially different
from men's jobs. The Equal Pay Act, applying only to those
situations in which men as well as women are employed doing
similar work, offers little protection to most working
women.
In an effort to end employment discrimination, Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act in 1964. Title VII of the Act
specifically referred to equal employment opportunity and
employment discrimination. Going far beyond the Equal Pay
Act both in terms of coverage and types of behavior
outlawed, Title VII made it illegal for employers to
discriminate in any employment practice on the basis of a
worker's race, religion, or ethnic origin, or sex (with
certain limited exceptions). Therefore, employers could no
longer institute separate pay scales for men and women.
However, instead of blending the two pay scales in a more
equitable fashion, employers often combined the wage scales
for men's and women's jobs and simply assigned women's jobs
the lowest wages. (See for example, Westinghouse case in
Treiman and Hartmann, 1961, p. 58). Thus, rather than
eliminate wage disparities employers just institutionalized
them in a different format.
What followed from Title VII was an affirmative action
program mandating quotas and timetables for training
programs and hiring policies. Supporters of Title VII
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believed that its implementation would open all jobs to
qualified applicants regardless of sex, race, or ethnic
background, and that eventually men and women would be
evenly distributed among all occupations, thus closing the
earning gap. (Lloyd and Neimi, 1979).
Twenty years later neither legislation to end wage
discrimination, nor improved opportunities for education and
training have significantly altered the economic situation
of the majority of women. Women continue to earn, on
average, roughly 60% of white male earnings. While equal
pay laws and improved access to non-traditional occupations
are important components of the effort to achieve economic
equity for women, they fall short of their goal. The Equal
Pay Act does not address the fact that men and women are
found in sex-segregated dissimilar occupations.
Title VII and affirmative action programs directly
addresses the problem of occupational segregation by working
to expand the opportunities for women and minorities to
enter male-typed occupations. However, while affirmative
action programs have fostered the movement of some women
into higher paying, male-dominated occupations, the pace of
occupational integration is far slower than the growth of
opportunities in female-dominated occupations. (Burris and
Wharton, 1962). Today's economy is marked by a declining
manufacturing sector (where many high paying male-dominated
jobs are found), and a rapidly growing service sector. Low
paying female-dominated occupations, including secretarial
and clerical work, and nursing, are among the fastest
growing occupations in this emerging economy. (Bluestone
and Kuhn, 1982). Thus, even if occupational integration
could guarantee a narrowing of the wage gap for those women
who move into higher paying male occupations, affirmative
action neglects the fact that most women will most likely
remain in female dominated occupations. Thus, such remedies
offer limited relief to the majority of working women. As
the NAS/NRC study concluded:
"Equal access to employment opportunities may be
expected to be more effective for new entrants than
for established workers and more effective for
those who have invested less in skills than for
those who have invested more. Since many women
currently in the labor force have invested years
of training time in their particular
skills...access to other jobs may not be preferred."
(Treiman and Hartmann, 1981, p.66)
The goal of comparable worth is not to move women out of
their chosen professions, but rather to compensate them
fairly for the work they are already doing.
Despite its drawbacks, Title VII does provides a
conceptual, if not legal, framework for comparable worth
efforts. (Steinberg, 1984). In the 1970's, as the struggle
to close the wage gap continued, women's groups, civil
rights organizations, and unions stepped up their efforts to
achieve pay equity based on a broad interpretation of Title
VII. Among the earliest activities was the successful
campaign in 1974 by the American Federation of State County
and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), with the cooperation of
the Washington State Women's Council, to get the State of
Washington to agree to undertake a comparable worth study of
state employees--the first such statewide study. (For
further discussion of this case refer to chapter 3).
While these activities were taking place, the legal
interpretation of Title VII remained unclear. Was the law
broad enough to cover cases where unequal wages were being
paid for dissimilar jobs of relatively equal value to an
employer? In a precedent setting decision, the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled in June 1981, in Gunther v. County of Wgshingtgn
that Title VII does have broader implications beyond equal
pay for equal work. While not specifically judging the
validity of the comparable worth issue, the Court held that
Title VII could be applied to cases of wage discrimination
in which men and women did not fill exactly the same job.
(Treiman and Hartmann, 1981, p.5). This historic ruling
laid the groundwork for further comparable worth campaigns.
Comparable worth has been promoted as an equal
employment policy which specifically addresses that part of
wage discrimination neglected by the Equal Pay Act and Title
VII: whether the work women do is systematically
undervalued either because job evaluation has not been
consistently applied to dissimilar male and female jobs or
because the content of women's jobs has been inaccurately
assessed, or both.
Most comparable worth activity has occurred at the
state and local level initiated by unions, or by commissions
on the status of women. Currently, twenty-six states have
initiatives dealing with sex-based wage discrimination.
Through legislation, collective bargaining, studies, and
litigation, comparable worth advocates began to press for an
end to sex-based wage discrimination--a practice which they
believe violates federal law and is largely responsible for
keeping women's wages artificially depressed. But how does
the concept of comparable worth get translated into policy?
What are the different strategies and tactics used to
implement comparable worth in wage setting? In the next
chapter, I review several cases of implementation.
Chapter 3: CASE STUDIES IN IMPLEMENTATION
Comparable worth activities are happening all around
the country, primarily in the public sector at the state
and local level. Currently, more than thirty state and
over one hundred localities have initiatives dealing with
comparable worth. Leaders in state and local governments,
women's groups and unions are addressing the need for
comparable worth through a variety of tactics including
legislation, litigation, collective bargaining., job
evaluation studies, and data collection. (NCPE, 1983; NCPE,
1984). The bulk of efforts to apply comparable worth
standards to pay inequities has been in the public sector
but sex-based wage discrimination has also been challenged
in the private sector, although there are fewer cases. The
public sector is the locus of action on comparable worth
primarily because job descriptions and wage structures are
public information, (generally speaking, this type of
information is not readily accessible in the private sector
(Bell, 1985, p. 289)), and because elected officials are
more receptive to public pressure. Furthermore, comparable
worth requires that an employer consistently value
dissimilar jobs; as substantial employers state and local
government have a wide spectrum of jobs well-suited for
comparable worth evaluation.
Another reason that comparable worth activity has
grown in the public sector is due to the changing nature of
the labor market. In the post World War II era, the public
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sector has experienced high growth. Women have entered the
labor force at an increasing rate, and many have gone into
public sector employment. At the same time,. public sector
unions were also growing and beginning to attract more
women. Today, women in the public sector are twice as
likely to be in a union than women in the workforce
overall. (Bell, 1985).
This high level of public sector unionization and high
level of women within those unions is significant. In each
of the cases I will consider, unions have played an
important role in promoting comparable worth. Indeed, the
unions most active in comparable worth campaigns have a
relatively high percentage of women and public sector
employees in their membership: the American Federation of
State County and Municipal Employees (40% female); the
Service Employees Union International (45% female); and the
American Nurses Association (nearly all female).
While unions have historically been involved in the
struggle for pay equity., the effort to identify and
eliminate sex-bias in wage setting of dissimilar jobs is a
relatively new area of concern. (Portman, et. al., 1984).
In the past, however, even when unions have represented
sizable numbers of women, they have not necessarily
addressed their concerns. (Blumrosen, 1979, p. 445).
Rather, as these cases demonstrate, unions have begun to
address the comparable worth issue because of women's
increasing participation in positions of union leadership,
and because addressing the issue might attract new workers
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from the growing service sector to unions in a time of
declining union membership. (Bell, 1985, p.280 ; Rondeau,
1985; Chernoff, 1985.).
Methodology
I have chosen six cases to illustrate how historical
wage inequities have been addresssed. I chose only cases
where wage adjustments have actually been made, although in
none of these cases were the initial wage increases enough
to fully close the identified gap between the wages of
male-typed and female-typed jobs. Five cases are in the
public sector (three at the local level and two at the
state level), and one is a private sector case. Two cases
illustrate the legislative approach to comparable worth
implementation, while four show the collective bargaining
approach. Comparable worth is a policy still in formation.
Thus, I also chose cases for which I could obtain enough
information to make analysis meaningful. My sources of
information include personal interviews, union materials,
published case studies, state government publications, and
newspaper and magazine articles.
WASHINGION STATE
Comparable worth received an important boost in
November 1983, when a federal judge in Tacoma, Washington
ruled that the state of Washington had discriminated
against female employees in not granting equal pay for work
of comparable worth. The state was ordered to remedy the
situation by paying back-wages and bringing present
salaries up to pay equity levels--a $600 million award.
Although the state is appealing the case, the decision that
the state was practicing "direct, overt and
institutionalized discrimination" (Remick, 1984b) has been
hailed as a major victory for proponents of comparable
worth.
The Washington case began in 1974 when the Washington
State Women's Council and the Washington Federation of
State Employees (an AFSCME affiliate) requested that the
governor initiate a study of the state's civil service
system. The governor agreed, and Washington became the
first state in the United States to evaluate public sector
employment explicitly to see if pay differentials existed
between jobs traditionally held by women and those
traditionally held by men. The governor hired Willis
Associates, a personnel consulting firm, to do the study
and appointed a ten member advisory committee, including
representatives from business, labor, women's groups, the
governor's office, and the state personnel department, to
monitor it.
*.., /
Rather than look at all three thousand job
classifications in the state, the committee chose to
compare 121 "benchmark" job categories that represented
sex-segregated occupations (i.e. jobs where the incumbents
were at least 70% same sex). The evaluation process
involved sending a questionnaire to a sample of 1600
employees. Using point rankings, the committee assigned
points to the jobs based on the level of knowledge, skill,
accountability, and effort the job required. Point levels
were then compared with pay scales in the state's civil
service system, which were based on elaborate salary
surveys of employers throughout the states. (Remick, 1984,
p.102).
The study's key finding was dramatic: female-
dominated jobs were being paid, on average, only 80% of
comparable male-dominated occupations. For example, a
registered nurse, a female-dominated job with 348 points,
earned $1368 monthly while a highway engineer III, a male-
dominated job with 345 points, earned $1980. As Table 4
shows, there was virtually no overlap in salary between
male and female job categories with the same point
rankings.
These results were received enthusiastically by the
women's groups and unions who had argued that systematic
wage discrimination was widespread in the state. Others
greeted the study's outcome more skeptically, arguing that
the market would never permit such blatant discrimination.
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THE 1974 WASHINGTON STATE STUDY
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At this point, the task force disbanded and the
implementation process moved to the legislative arena. The
legislature., however, refused to appropriate any funds to
correct the wage inequities.
Shortly before leaving office, the governor, a strong
supporter of comparable worth, included $7 million in his
1976 budget to begin implementation of initial comparable
worth adjustments. The incoming governor, Dixy Lee Ray,
campaigned on a platform which included support for
comparable worth. Once in office, however, rather than
accept the study, she challenged its methodology, claiming
that comparable worth was like "comparing apples, pumpkins,
and a can of worms" (Remick, 1984, p. 104), and refused to
institute any raises. Throughout her four years in office,
Ray actively opposed any implementation efforts.
Despite the governor's ardent opposition, the
Washington Federation of State Employees continued to push
the issue in the state legislature. In 1978, the
legislature adopted a union-sponsored bill requiring the
state personnel office to prepare comparable worth cost
estimates in conjunction with its biennial salary
recommendations to the legislature. These reports were to
show the cost of equalizing salaries of jobs which appeared
to be underpaid; but the statute failed to provide a
mechanism for documenting the pay disparities. Such
reports were prepared in 1979, 1981, and 1983.
During the 1980 gubernatorial election, both
candidates supported comparable worth, but once in office
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the new governor paid little attention to the issue. In
1981, the legislature again considered a bill mandating the
implementation of comparable worth, but the opposition
prevailed and the bill died in session. In July 1982,
disgruntled by inaction on the part of the state, AFSCME
filed a suit against the state with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging intentional
discrimination in compensation. Shortly thereafter, the
comparable worth bill was reintroduced into the state
legislature. This time, with the strong lobbying efforts
of AFSCME, SEIU, and the Washington Nurses Association, the
bill passed. The new law included provisions calling for
comparable worth salary increases to close the gap to be
implemented over a ten year period, as well as actual
appropriations for initial implementation. Employees in
job classes paid at least 20% below the average
compensation were awarded $100 per year for two years (a
total award of $1.5 million) to begin closing the gap.
Additional appropriations to further close the gap over the
next decase are expected to be forthcoming. This affected
some 8,000 individuals, all in female-dominated job
categories.
Despite these actions, the AFSCME vs. State of
Washington suit went to trial as scheduled. Judge Tanner
handed down his guilty verdict in November 1983, ruling
that the past and present state compensation practices were
unfair towards women. He ordered the state to institute
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immdate aar rase .for stt employees in female-
dominated jobs, and ordered payment of back wages for the
two years prior to the initial complaint being filed. The
state is appealing this ruling. Had the state instituted
pay increases at the time of the completion of the original
study, the total cost of correcting the wage gap would have
cost a total of approximately 5% of the annual payroll
spread out over several years. The state's refusal to act
resulted in the law suit and the back pay award. If the
state loses its appeal, total implementation could cost
approximately 25% of state payroll.
While the state's appeal may take several years,
action on comparable worth continues in Washington. The
$100 award mandated by legislation is considered by the
unions to be a downpayment on further efforts to close the
wage gap. Presently, three groups are working on
implementation plans. State legislators are expected to
pick one of the plans by the summer of 1985. While the
statute calls for a ten year implementation period,
legislators and the unions are hoping to complete it in
six. (Remick, 1980; 1984a; 1984b; NCPE, 1984; Turner and
Wilson, 1984;).
MTmm~qnISTO
In March 1982, the state of Minnesota authorized the
first stage of implementation of comparable worth increases
for undervalued female-dominated job categories amounting
to $21.7 million. The second phase of increases is
expected to be awarded in 1985. Together the increases
amount to only 4% of state payroll over a four year period
and benefit more than 9,000 state employees, 90% female and
54% in clerical positions.
The largest state employees union, AFSCME, which
represents approximately 60% of Minnesota state workers,
working together with the Minnesota Council on the Economic
Status of Women successfully lobbied the governor to deal
with the issue of comparable worth. The governor set up a
Pay Equity Task Force and appointed its members, including
union representatives, legislators from both the House and
Senate, members from the Council, representatives from the
Office of Employee Relations, and several businessmen. The
Task Force was charged with evaluating the state
compensation system to see whether pay scales were in
accordance with the findings of a statewide job
classification study done by Hay Associates, an independent
consulting firm, in 1979.
The Hay study included only executive branch jobs (90%
of state employees work in that branch). Judicial and
legislative jobs were exempt, primarily because their
salaries were set by statute. The Hay study revealed that
female-dominated job categories were undervalued by the
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civil service classification plan by approximately 20%.
The Task Force used these results to estimate the cost of
the undervaluation of traditionally female jobs. The total
cost of correcting pay inequitites was calculated to be 4%
of the state's annual payroll.
As in Washington, following the issuance of its
report, the Task Force disbanded and implementation moved
to the legislative arena. Due to widespread bipartisan
support, the legislature passed the enabling legislation
mandating comparable worth as state policy and providing
for a phase-in of comparable worth adjustments. In 1982,
the first appropriation of $21.7 million was authorized by
the legislature, and then distributed through collective
bargaining.
The legislation requires the Commissioner of Employee
Relations to report to the legislature on a biennial basis
listing the job classes with wage inequities.
Additionally, the Department of Employee Relations (DER)
must provide a cost estimate for equalizing the pay of
undervalued job classes.
While the initial pay equity increases were based on
the Hay study, future job classifications and evalutions
will be the responsibility of the DER. DER uses the Hay
system with one modification: they give greater weight and
compensation to jobs requiring repetitive tasks, including
small muscular movements. Employees may be interviewed
about their job requirements, but classification is not
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barqained over. Any worker dissatisfied with his/her job
classification can appeal to the DER for an audit.
Once wage inequities have been identified, the
legislature must appropriate money to correct them. The
funds are divided up among the various bargaining units
based on the number of underpaid classes each represents.
Actual distribution of funds is then collectively
bargained; the money can only go to those job classes
designated as underpaid.
The first installment of wage equity increases was made
in 1983 through negotiations with the unions. The unions
decided to distribute the $21.7 million appropriation
equally among all eligible classes; in addition, all
workers got cost of living adjustments as well. Even
though the state bargains with eight unions (11 units) with
varying levels of female membership, inter-union equity has
not been a problem because all state employees are on the
same classification and pay scale system. Appropriations
for the second two-year installment of pay equity will be
decided on in 19e5 by the Minnesota legislature. The total
cost of implementation has been spread out over four years,
making comparable worth adjustments only 1% of payroll per
year, or 4% total.
Bonnie Watkins of the DER attributes the success of
Minnesota's comparable worth program to several factors.
First, the state already had done a job evaluation study
when the comparable worth issue was raised by the unions.
This eliminated any disageements over whether or not to
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order an evaluation study, rather, the issue was to apply
comparable worth standards to see if the existing plan
underpaid female-dominated job classes. Watkins explains:
"The study did show a 20% gap so we decided to
use it. Our immediate concern was getting [wage3
adjustments for women. Some comparable worth
programs focus too much attention on the system of
evaluation instead of on the inequity. Most
systems, although done differently, do show a wage
gap between the sexes. As my boss says, :you don't
need a microscopic instrument to see a gap a mile
wide."
Second, the Task Force composition was broad and well-
balanced, allowing for a smooth operation. The Task Force
was able to reach an agreement before going to the
legislature with its recommendations. The bi-partisan
support for comparable worth was crucial in getting it
through the state government. Finally, it was relatively
easy to get the appropriations, because Minnesota was in
good financial shape at the time.
Due to the success that the state government has had
in implementing comparable worth at the state level, the
legislature decided to implement comparable worth at the
local level as well. In 1984, the legislature passed a
bill mandating comparable worth standards in local
governments' compensation systems. All localities,
including cities, counties, and school districts, are
expected to implement comparable worth by 1987.
SAN 3 OSEL_ CALIFORNIA
On July 14, 1961, the first collective bargaining unit
contract incorporating the concept of comparable worth in
the United States was signed between Local 101 of the
American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees (AFSCME) and the city of San Jose, California.
(AFSCME, 1962). The two year, $5.4 million contract
included not only a 15% across the board pay increase for
all employees, but also allocated $1.5 million for
"internal equity adjustments" to underpaid job classes.
This marked the first time the issue of comparable worth
had been successfully negotiated through the collective
bargaining process. It also marked an end to the nation's
first comparable worth strike by the AFSCME Local,
representing approximately 2000 of the 3000 city employees
in clerical, administrative, parks and recreation, library
and airport refueling positions.
AFSCME first raised the issue of comparable worth in
San Jose in the mid-seventies. Progress was temporarily
stopped when the voters in California passed Proposition 13
and city wages were frozen. When negotiations between the
union and the city reopened in 1981, the comparable worth
issue resurfaced as a major bargaining issue. While
refusing to address the comparable worth concerns of non-
management employees, the city manager agreed to a wage
study of management positions within the city, although not
specifically addressing differences between male- and
female-dominated job categories. Non-management positions
47
were excluded from the original study because the city
manager insisted that those wages be set through the
collective bargaining process. In response to management's
refusal to address their concerns, some eighty union women
staged a one day "sick-out." Finally, the AFSCME Local
prevailed upon the city council to order a second study.
A task force was established, consisting of San Jose
Personnel Department employees and AFSCME representatives.
From the start, the comparable worth process in San Jose
was a joint labor-management effort. By agreement between
the city and the union, Hay Associates, an independent
consulting firm, was hired to do a comparable worth study
of the city's compensation system. Using their own point
factor method, Hay reclassified city jobs into 225 job
categories. The study excluded the police officers' and
firefighters' bargaining units. Hay Associates found that
after consistently evaluating all jobs, wages for women
jobs were on average 15-20. below wages for comparable
male-dominated occupations.
The city and the union agreed with the findings, but
they disagreed over the solutions. While the two sides
were negotiating over how to implement the study's
findings, the Gunther decision was handed down by the U.S.
Supreme Court (see Chapter 2). In the wake of this
decision, and with talks at an impasse, AFSCME decided to
file a suit with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) alleging intentional discrimination.
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WitH 1Ls ;a a A t=lemate, and despite state laws
prohibiting public unions from striking, AFSCME Local 101
finally went out on strike--the first strike in the United
States over the issue of comparable worth.
Nine days later the strike ended with the signing of
the new contract. The union also agreed to drop its suit
with the EEOC. In addition to across the board cost of
living increases, the contract provided "pay equity" wage
adjustments of between 5% and 15% for some 62 undervalued
job classes. When the city employees contract was
renegotiated in 1983, San Jose employees in undervalued
occupations received, on average, an additonal 5% "pay
equity" increase, bringing most underpaid jobs up to par
with jobs of comparable worth. (AFSCME, 1984; Bunzel, 1982;
McGuire, 1982; Koziara, 1983; Farnquist, Armstrong,
Strausbaugh, 1983).
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CONTRA COSTI COUNTY. CALIFORNIA
In August 1984, Contra Costa County in northern
California became the state's first county to agree to
comparable worth wage increases. The 3% increase, which
came on top of general wage adjustments, was the result of
a fourteen month bargaining struggle between the County and
a union coalition including the Service Employees
International Union (SEIU) Local 535, two AFSCME locals,
and the California Nurses Association (CNA) local, which
together represent more than half of the County's
workforce. The hard won wage increase benefited not only
coalition union members but also workers in all female-
dominated classes in the county, including non-union
management positions.
The fight for comparable worth was a constant uphill
battle achieved through the persistant efforts of the union
coalition. When the union coalition formed in the fall of
1982, there was one sympathetic politician on the County
Board of Supervisors, who helped pass a resolution that the
Board would include achievement of comparable worth as part
of the county's affirmative action goals.
The Board charged the Personnnel Department to prepare
a report on the issue. Unlike the other case studies, no
union members worked on the study. This contributed to the
high level of dissatisfaction with the Department's study.
According to Lee Finney, chief shop steward for SEIU Local
535, the union coalition expected that the study would
examine comparable worth studies done in other localities
and do an analysis -f the County's wage structure by
"piggybacking" these other studies using similar methods to
assess wage discrimination in Contra Costa County. In the
end, the study fell far short of this goal; it contained a
market survey of wages which showed that women's jobs were
underpaid based on prevailng wages but it did not look at
the question of internal wage equity. According to Finney,
the report was "very fat and said very little. It did
nothing to dramatize the existence of a male-female wage
gap." Rather, the study reviewed other studies and
contained a market survey showing the general gap between
male and female jobs. As a result of the study, the County
offered the unions a 1% comparable worth adjustment.
Believing a larger wage gap existed and dissatisfied
with the management study, Finney undertook her own study
of the County's pay structure using whatever data were
available on the numbers of men and women employed and
their wages. There were no data on compensable factors
because the County had a general classification system.
Wages were set through the collective bargaining process, a
proces by which average wages are set without regard for
individual jobs. Using aggregate figures on the number of
men and women within each job grade and the relative pay
levels, Finney discovered a 30% wage gap between female-
and male-dominated job categories. She explained:
"My results were dramatic. There really is no
Eexplicit] classification system in Contra Costa
County. That's why the Board of Supervisors didn't
want us Ethe unions3 poking around. They made it clear
from the beginning that they weren't going to do a job
evaluation study. They were advised that the decision
to study was a decision to implement. The Washington
State case created a big fear of being sued."
When the County contracts expired in June 1983, the four
unit coalition took a two-pronged approach to negotiations.
Each bargaining unit agreed to negotiate separately over
the general terms of its contract, while comparable worth
would be bargained jointly. The County was reluctant to
study the comparable worth issue fearing the costs of
implementing pay adjustments in a time of fiscal crisis.
The negotiations for comparable worth adjustments delayed
the entire process, dragging on for over a year, but as
Finney says, "We had the power of information. We knew
more than they (management) did, because of my study. It
was very powerful." As the negotiations continued, the
coalition became more resolved in its effort to gain some
adjustment towards rectifying the wage gap. The coalition
of women stuck together despite management's efforts to
break them up by offering large salary raises to only some
of the units and particular union leaders; fourteen months
of bargaining had solidified the group.
The comparable worth increases were won during a time
of financial crisis for the county. The coalition
strategy, therefore, was to get whatever increase they
could from the County. The coalition realized that in the
long run, a job evaluation study would be needed to fully
and completely understand the nature and extent of the wage
disparities. Understanding that a study could take as long
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as three years to complete, and recognizing the County's
willingness to bargain some comparable worth raises, the
coalition decided to push for a reasonable initial raise
which would help close the gap. The unions consider the 3'4
increase a downpayment with the expectation that additional
concessions will be forthcoming in future contract
negotiations. The Contra Costa County case is remarkable
because the comparable worth adjustments were won based on
an union study.
It is interesting to note that during the negotiation
process, the management tried to get wage concessions from
all unions and even threatened to cut hospital jobs due to
the fiscal crisis. At one point members of Local 1., an
unaffilitated union not involved in the comparable worth
negotiations (in which men hold all leadership positions)
stood up and argued that the coalition women should give up
their comparable worth demand in order to save their
sisters' jobs at the hospital. No one ever called on union
brothers to give up any wage increases, although men were
earning considerably more.
At the bargaining table, as part of the comparable
worth negotiations, the coalition also demanded and won the
establishment of a labor-management committee to do a study
of benchmark job classifications and to recommend which job
categories should be addressed at the next round of
negotiations. A task force was set up with equal union
and management representation. The Deputy Sheriffs' and
Firefighters' unions did not oppose comparable worth, yet
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they have not been actively involved with the committee; it
is not yet clear whether or not nthey will be part of the
proposed job evaluation study.
Negotiations are now scheduled to reopen in April
1985. It remains to be seen how much the County is willing
to bargain further pay equity adjustments.
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VAA6ILLE2. CELIFORNIA
During the November, 1982 school board elections in
Vacaville, California, members of SEIU Local 614
successfully lobbied candidates on the issue of support for
comparable worth. As a result, several board members were
elected who actively supported the idea. Subsequently,
through negotiations, a Comparable Worth Committee was set
up, including two administrators from the District, two
school board members, four SEIU Local 614 members and the
union business agent. The Committee was responsible for
studying wage inequities in the school district. A year
and a half later when the union contract became effective,
it included pay equity adjustments ranging between 2.5% and
22.5%, on top of across the board annual wage increases.
How did the union successfully accomplish this comparable
worth victory in a rather conservative, rural city? Carol
Dorty, vice president of Local 614 and member of the
Committee, believes that the steadfast efforts of the local
union members, first in lobbying the school board and then
persisting through many long, difficult meetings, were
largely responsible for the success of this comparable
worth drive.
The Committee's first task was to review comparable
worth studies done in other states and localities. After
reviewing some 18 studies done by other localities, the
Committee unanimously agreed to adopt the job evaluation
format developed in a nearby school district. This
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"homegrown" job evaluation method, developed by the
Sacramento School District and its union employees, used
point rankings to evaluate jobs on the basis of knowledge,
skill, complexity, responsiblity, and working conditions,
and it was specfically geared towards assessing tasks and
skills of school district jobs. The Vacaville study
included all 300 classified workers, except management
personnel and teachers.
Rather than hire an outside consultant, the Committee
conducted its own job evaluation study using this homegrown
method. Job descriptions were circulated to every
employee, asking them to review and update the descriptions
as necessary. The updated descriptions were then used to
do the job evaluation and draw up a draft study and
recommendations, including job descriptions, point
rankings, and recommended pay ranges for each position.
The draft study was then circulated to all employees for
further feedback. Several comments were received and
reviewed, resulting in only two changes in the final study.
Dorty reported that "We (the Committee members) agreed
upfront that if there was disagreement among committee
members on descriptions, we would vote and the majority
would decide. However, if the committee could not agree
between two point scores for a job, we would adopt the
higher figure."
The final study showed a wage gap of as much as 22.5%
between comparable male-and female-dominated jobs and was
accepted by the Board and the union. Previously, the
district used job descriptions to slot jobs into pay
grades. Rather than change the pay ranges, the jobs were
reslotted based on the point rankings, making the
classification system more explicit. The resulting pay
increases ranged from 2.5% to 22.5% to be instituted over
the five years of the current contract. Raises went to all
undervalued female-dominated jobs with clericals,
instructional aides, and cafeteria workers getting the
biggest raises.
One of the most important features of the Vacaville
comparable worth program is that the ongoing process of
implementation is the responsibility of the Comparable
Worth Committee. They are in charge of reviewing the job
evaluation process and hearing any appeals. The Committee
meets every two months and is composed of union, district,
and community representatives. The committee can handle
grievances on job classifications and will work to
regularly update the study. The Committee has also been
assigned by the School Board to review any matters relating
to reclassification. Dorty says,
"We will continue to meet every two months. We're
determined because we worked hard and want to
maintain what we won; but I tell others not to do
it (a comparable worth study) unless they're
willing to work. It takes lots of work, lots of
homework, a lot of time...but look what we got!"
(Dorty, 1985).
Sources: (Dorty, 1985; Vacaville Unified School District,
1984)
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YALE UNIVERSITY
Twenty months after voting for union representation,
Yale University clerical and technical workers
overwhelmingly ratified their first contract in January
1965. For the 2600 (mostly female) members of Local 34,
Federation of University Employees, the key issue in the
contract was comparable worth. This contract marks one of
the first major collective bargaining contracts in the
private sector and the first at a university to incorporate
the concept of comparable worth.
Ending a two year campaign, the majority of Yale
clerical and technical workers voted to join the union in
May 1963. While many thought the bulk of their work was
behind them, the contract negotiations would turn out to be
a long, difficult struggle as well; one which culminated in
a ten-week strike. From the beginning, the union
negotiating effort was a grassroots campaign in which the
workers, predominantly women, played an important role.
The Local's demands were worked out by a 35 member rank and
file negotiating committee. With an average unit salary of
only $13,400, the membership's--82% women and 13% black--
main concern was raising salary levels.
At the bargaining table the union's demands were two-
fold. First, they were demanding across the board wage
increases. A union survey of employers in the greater New
Haven area found that Yale salaries were among the lowest.
The union also charged that the bargaining unit as a whole
was underpaid due to its primarily female membership.
58
Second, the union was able to document that both inter- and
intra-unit wage disparities existed. Findings showed that
within the Local 34 bargaining unit, blacks and women were
being paid less than whites and men doing comparable work--
even though blacks and women had, on average, greater
seniority. Similar wage disparities were also found through
a selective comparison of jobs between Local 34 and the
other major bargaining unit at the university, Local 35--a
predominantly male, blue-collar unit. Part of the wage
discrepancy was attributed to the earlier unionization of
blue collar jobs, but the union claimed that the continued
wage disparity was linked to sex-based wage discrimination.
While the administration recognized the problem of
underpayment of women workers, they reFused to bargain over
the issue. William Brainard, Provost for the University,
typified the administration's feelings, admitting that
"I know that one can't live the way one would like
to, or the way one would like one's family to live,
on a Yale clerical and technical salary. That's a
national problem, which Yale can't be expected to
solve." (Local 34, 1984, p. 1).
An additional concern to the union was the 'slotting' of
jobs, or establishment of job grades. It appeared from the
review of salaries that women at Yale were not being fairly
compensated for their seniority. Promotion was done in an
unsystematic, arbitrary manner. As one secretary put it,
"I started work with the man I still work for,
18 years ago. I started as a Secretary C. He
started as an instructor. He's now a full tenured
professor, and I have gone up one labor grade. In
his latest book he thanked me, not for my typing,
but for my wisdom and maturity in helping develop
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the program. He deserves his professorship, but I
deserve better too." (Local 34, 1984).
Negotiations began in October 1983. After more than 60
negotiating sessions, and with no agreement in sight,
workers threatened to strike in the spring of 1984. Then,
in March 1984 the two sides reached agreement on non-
economic issues, including job security and health and
safety issues, and a strike was postponed.
At the time, Yale management argued that their studies
indicated that wage discrepancies between men and women
clerical and technical workers disappeared when wages were
analyzed by salary grade and years. The union disputed
this contention charging that discrimination occurred both
within and across job grades and bargaining utnis. Acting
independently, Raymond Fair, a Yale professor of economics,
conducted a regression analysis on Yale wages. While not
addressing the differentials within the clerical and
techincal unit he determined that there was a statistically
significant difference in the wages of men and women across
job grades.
In May 1984, as negotiations continued, the Yale
campus chaplain proposed that an impartial three member
committee be set up to look at the charges of wage and job
discrimination. The union readily agreed to the plan; the
university opposed it. As the summer months passed, little
progress was made. The union began to reconsider going out
on strike. As an alternative to a strike, the union
proposed to the Yale administration that the unresolved
issues be submitted to binding arbitration. Again the
administration refused to submit to an impartial third
party negotiator. Left with no alternatives, the union
held a strike vote in early September. The workers voted
overwhelmingly in favor of the strike. On September 22,
just as students were returning to school, members of Local
34 went out on strike. In addition, eleven hundred
workers, members of Local 35, honored the picket line and
stayed off the job.
Although the university claimed to be doing "business
as usual," the strike caused serious disruptions in the
running of the university. Some 400 classes were held off
campus as students and professors refused to cross the
picket line. Several of the student dining halls were
closed down, libraries were understaffed, and the absence
of lab technicians delayed many experiments. .Support for
the union was widespread. About half the student body
actively supported the strike, many withholding their
spring tuition to protest the administration's refusal to
settle; others resented the inconvenience but honored the
picket line. A vocal anti-union group of students crossed
picket lines, but their numbers were relatively small.
As the negotiations dragged on, the university
remained stubborn in its refusal to discuss comparable
worth. Shortly before Christmas vacation, the union
surprised the administration by threatening to return to
work; an unusual tactic. The union realized that the
university would only be too glad to have the union out
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over the long winter break when few students were around.
Interestingly enough, the threat to go back to work brought
the first, albeit miniscule, offer of a pay increase.
Following through on its threat, and to the dismay of many,
the union went back to work on December 5, claiming that
they would walk out again when classes resumed on January
19, if a settlement had not been reached. January 19 was
also the expiration date on Local 35's contract, which was
being bargained concurrently.
Faced with a choice of reaching a settlement or facing
another semester of disruption, the administration finally
offered the union a serious proposal. On January 22, the
union ratified its first contract. Its provisions went way
beyond the union's initial expectations and included some
comparable worth provisions. First, the contract provided
present employees across the board increases averaging more
than 20% over three and a half years. Because the raises
were combined with a new classification structure the
raises went disproportionetely to women within the unit
alleviating wage discrepancies between male and female
jobs within the unit.
Second, the centerpiece of the new contract is the new
job classification structure incorporating a "step
progression system." One factor creating a wage
discrepancy at Yale was that the technical and clerical
occupations had no explicit progression of jobs; neither
length of time at Yale nor in a particular position were
not rewarded in any systematic way. The new system is
based on accrual of years with each of the seventeen steps
representing approximately one year at Yale. In addition,
the lowest salary grade will be eliminated as of July 1,
1985. The workers in this grade are exclusively female and
predominantly black. Together with the across-the-board
increases, the new system will provide, on average 35%
increases for employees, bringing the unit's average salary
up from $13,500 to $18,500. This will close about 50% of
the wage gap between the male and female-dominated unions.
Finally, the contract establishes a Joint Committee to
review Yale job classifications, review all relevant facts
in light of comparable worth, and offer suggestions on
amending or changing the classification system. In
addition, the Committee will handle appeals from any
employee dissatisfied with her or his job classification.
The Committee consists of four management representatives
and four union members, as well as one mutually agreed upon
Yale faculty member. The work of this committee will be
essential in the effort to bring pay equity to the clerical
and technical workers. As one union member put it, "Our
biggest task is in the next three years and the work of
this committee." (Chernoff, 1985)
The new union contract at Yale does not completely
resolve the comparable worth issue, but it is an important
start. Comparable worth has been raised as an issue at the
bargaining table. (Local 34, 1984; 1985; Chernoff, 1985;
Consuelo O'Brien, 1985; Findlay, 1985)
6.
SUMMARY
These are six examples drawn from the many cases
around the country involveing comparable worth. The cases
reflect the fact that state and local governments are
laying important groundwork in the area of comparable
worth. The promotion and study of comparable worth by
state and local officials is important in helping to
educate workers about comparable worth and in helping to
legitimize the concept. However, these cases also indicate
that there is still considerable controvery about the
concept and its application as a policy instrument to
correct alleged wage discrimination. Management often
opposes comparable worth becuase of the additional costs.
In San Jose, Contra Costa County, Washington, and Yale,
cost was one of management's major reasons for resisting
implementation. Yet, action around sex-based wage
discrimination can help challenge the widely held opinion
that women's work is less valuable and as such is not being
unfairly compensated.
Though some private sector cases have been won most
accomplishments have occured in the public sector through
well-organized union efforts. It is the goal of pay equity
advocates to reach all women workers both in the private
and public sector, unionized and non-unionized. However,
in the foreseeable future, the battle will continue to be
fought primarily by unions for their members.
Despite the use of different evaluation techniques
each job evaluation study identified an approximately 15%-
20% wage gap between the salaries of comparable male and
female jobs. This is relative to research showing that on
average women earn 60% of wages that men earn in the
economy as a whole.
Identifying the gap is an important first step in
achieving comparable worth. Once a wage gap is identified
wage increases must be instituted and a new standard of
equity maintained. In each case workers and management
identified a wage gap and some money was awarded to close
the gap. It remains to be seen whether the gap will be
completely eliminated and whether a comparable worth
standard of equity maintained in these employers'
compensation systems.
Though some private sector comparable worth cases have
been won, most accomplishments have occured in the public
sector through well-organized union efforts. It is the goal
of comparable worth advocates to reach all women workers
both in the private and public sectors, unionized and non-
unionized. However, in the foreseeable future, the battle
will continue to be fought primarily in the public sector
by unions on behalf of their members.
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Chapter 4: CASE STUDY ANALYSIS
At a time when wage increases in the public sector are
being curtailed by reduced budgets and concession bargaining
is commonplace in the private sector, these case studies
illustrate how some groups of workers have been able to
affect the terms of compensation through the implementation
of comparable worth. Primarily through collective
bargaining and legislation, employees in undervalued,
female-dominated job classes have won "pay equity" wage
adjustments .
Although the mechanisms for instituting changes in wage
structures can vary, these cases show that in practice the
implementation of comparable worth tends to involve a number
of similar steps, though they are not always achieved in the
same chronological order: 1) the recggnitig of sex-based
wage disparities and the promotion by women's groups,
unions, and politicians of comparable worth as one way to
address wage discrimination; 2) the establishment of a task
force to investigate wage setting procedures within the
firm; 3) the conducting and/or reviewing of igb evaluation
techniques; 4) the achievement of wage Adgustments; and 5)
the establishment of a long term grggess to evaluate jobs
over time, and make additional adjustments as needed.
In this chapter, I discuss the two general approaches
most often used to implement comparable worth: collective
bargaining and legislation. In each case study, employer and
employees reached agreement recognizing that sex-based wage
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discrimination was a potential problem and accepting the use
of some type of job evalution as a technique to identify the
discrimination. They then agreed to begin rectifying sex-
bias in wages through the payment of adjustments independent
of other wage increases.
While both collective bargaining and legislation can be
effective avenues for winning comparable worth pay
increases, each process is shaped by political and
institutional constraints which produce advantages and
disadvantages for each and affect how implementation
proceeds. I will use the cases to highlight the aspects of
collective bargaining and legislation which seem important
to achieving successful implementation, and explore the
significant differences between the two approaches.
For the purpose of analysis, the cases can be divided
into two groups: those achieved primarily through
legislative procedures and those achieved primarily through
direct labor-management negotiation. Implementation of
comparable worth through the enactment of legislation has
only been carried out in the public sector where the
government is the employer. This process of implementation
may or may not involve unions or collective bargaining,
though unions can exert important political pressure through
lobbying and litigation efforts.
The collective bargaining approach implements comparable
worth through a negotiated settlement between employer and
employees and, therefore, recognizes a particular role for
unions in decision-making at each step of the way. The
focus is on labor-management relations rather than on
activity within a legislative body. In the public sector
the state or local government is the employer, in the
private sector it is the firm. The Washington and
Minnesota cases are examples of the legislative approach.
The San Jose, Contra Costa County, Vacaville, and Yale cases
are examples of the collective bargaining approach.
Legislation
Implementing comparable worth through legislation
depends heavily upon the actions of elected officials. In
both Minnesota and Washington, the governors responded to
public pressure of unions and women's groups by
establishing a special task force to oversee and monitor a
comparable worth study. The governors retained
responsibility for appointing the task force, determining
the task force's role in the process, and hiring consultants
to do a job evaluation.
These task force played a major role in influencing the
implementation of comparable worth because they were
responsible for studying the issue, evaluating or
supervising the evaluation of the employer's current wage
structure, and making recommendations on how implementation
should proceed. In order to secure a firm base of support
for the results, the task forces included representatives of
management and labor. Labor delegates are usually from
unions which represent employees in undervalued job classes.
Because the passage of legislation requires broad-based
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political support these task forces have a broader
constituency than just labor and management and, therefore,
usually include legislative representatives, private sector
employers, and women's groups representatives, as well as
state personnel officials and union officials.
In legislative cases, it appears that detailed
systematic studies must be done before legislation can be
passed and appropriations made. In Minnesota, the state
hired Hay Associates to do a job evaluation study in order
to update the state job classification system. The
Minnesota task force had no role in choosing the consultant,
but was charged with reviewing the consultant's study to
identify whether comparable worth standards had been
consistently applied in assigning wages to male and female-
dominated job classes with equivalent points. In
Washington, union and women's groups lobbied the government
to do a study of non-management jobs after a study of
management level jobs showed that employees in certain job
categories were being underpaid. As in the Minnesota case,
it was the governor who chose the consulting firm to do the
study. When the studies were completed, the task forces
made their recommendation to the respective legislatures and
disbanded. Completing implementation then became primarily
a responsibility of the legislature and the governor.
Implementation of comparable worth through legislation
faces significant political hazards in fulfilling its
targets because of the changing constituencies of
legislatures and the shifting balance of power between
political parties within the legislative body. (Cook, 1984,
p. 8). Support for comparable worth is required for two
stages of implementation. Proponents must first push to
have a task force set up and a study done. Once a study is
completed, political support within the legislature is
necessary to get legislation and appropriations passed.
If sympathetic politicians are in office, this proces
may be relatively easy to accomplish (e.g. Minnesota), but
it takes ongoing personal commitment on the part of the
governor and elected legislature to promote and support the
issue. However, if elected officials are opposed to
comparable worth or if supportive politicians are removed
from office, the process may be difficult to start or
continue. In Washington, although the governor supported
the results of the comparable worth study, the legislature
refused to act on it. Later, when Dixy Lee Ray became
governor, she effectively blocked the implementation of the
comparable worth study by deleting any appropriations from
her state budget. (Remick, 1984). It was several years
before legislation was enacted by a new legislature.
In any event, getting comparable worth implemented
seems to require that political support be mobilized and
sustained over a long period of time. If this support
cannot be maintained, implementation may not occur. Bonnie
Watkins, of the Minnesota Department of Employee Relations,
claims that without bipartisan support and the strong
endorsement of the unions and Women's Council thoroughout
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the entire process, the legislation would never even have
made it out of committee (Watkins, 1985). In contrast,
comparable worth proponents in Washington were unable to
generate lasting support and the legislature refused to
approve the comparable worth study's results; and the
incoming governor vetoed the comparable worth appropriations
recommended by her predecessor.
When successful, legislation can provide a legal,
institutionalized process for achieving comparable worth.
The success of comparable worth laws seems to be dependent
on the law including not only a method for identifying
comparable worth but also specific guidelines for making
comparable worth appropriations. The inclusion of a method
for estimating the cost of implementation and for
appropriating needed funds seems to be crucial to getting
adjustments. Herein lies the key to Minnesota's
successful implementation. First, the task force's
recommendation to the legislature included a 'price tag' for
implementing comparable worth. Second, the law enacting
comparable worth as state policy included a method for
identifying sex-based wage discrimination and the cost of
eliminating it over time as well.
While the election of a legislature or a governor
opposed to comparable worth and willing to veto comparable
worth adjustments could halt or delay implementation, the
inclusion in the legislation of the intent, the method, and
the timetable for implementation may reduce the likelihood
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that this could occur. Other states have conducted
comparable worth studies and then failed to implement them
because a method for pricing implementation was never
included in the legislation. (For example, Kentucky and
Illinois (Cook, 1984)). Several states, including New York
and New Jersey, are currently conducting job evaluation
studies. As a response to inaction in other states, these
states have now included appropriations procedures in their
comparable worth legislation as a way of insuring
implementation. (Cook, 1984, p.272).
In contrast, the task force in Washington never
presented the legislature with an estimate of the cost of
rectifying the wage gap between male and female jobs. This
is one of the reasons that contributed to the legislature's
inaction on the study's results. When legislation finally
passed in 1982, it included a method for implementing
increases over time and an initial appropriation of funds.
The methodology used in a comparable worth study may
also have an affect on its ultimate success. Remick (1980)
claims that if Washington state's experience is
generalizable, once an evaluation system is touted as
eliminating sex-bias (i.e., benefitting women over other
groups of workers), getting it implemented may be difficult.
(Remick, 1980, p. 418). Implementation may be easier if the
system presents some general benefit (i.e. making a
previously chaotic compensation system more explicit) in
addition to correction of sex inequities. Minnesota's
experience supports this; the legislature accepted the
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comparable worth study because it was based on a job
evaluation study done originally as a way to modify and
improve the state's civil service system. Only later were
comparable worth standards applied to evaluate if inequities
between male-dominated and female-dominated jobs existed.
If the achievement of wage adjustments through the
legislative process is stymied by political changes or
inadequate wording of legislation, one alternative for
comparable worth advocates is to proceed with litigation.
Litigation can, however, be a long, expensive process--both
for the defendant and for the plaintiff. In the end, the
results are uncertain. Because the legal interpretation of
comparable worth is still in dispute, and the federal
courts, in general, seem to be unsympathtic if not hostile,
relying on litigation may turn out to be an ineffective way
to achieve comparable worth. (Steinberg, 1980; See Lemons
vs. City agd gouty g_ _enver, 1978; Christensen vs. State
of Iowa, 1977 in Blumrosen, 1979).
In Washington, where public unions are prohibited by law
from striking, the union chose to proceed with litigation
when the state refused to implement the comparable worth
adjustments. AFSCME charged the state with intentional sex
discrimination in compensation. At the same time, the
unions and womens' groups continued to exert pressure on the
legislature to implement adjustments. After several
attempts, the legislature finally approved a comparable
worth bill implementing adjustments over a ten year period.
(Some claim the law passed only when the 'gender gap' became
an issue of such great concern that politicains supported
the bill in order to attract women voters.) Later, a
federal district judge ruled that these appropriations were
too little, too late, constituting an inequity in itself and
ordered the state to make large back-pay awards. The
decision is currently being appealed, and the state has been
granted a stay in implementing the awards.
In Minnesota and Washington, once legislation was
approved, the state made initial appropriations and put
responsibility for overseeing implementation in the hands of
the state personnel office. This makes implementation a
more top-down approach than that achieved through collective
bargaining. Despite the fact that the personnel office is
supposed to seek employee input, and that there is usually a
grievance procedure, main decision-making for the process
relies on the inclinations of the political personalities in
power because in most state's, as in both Minnesota and
Washington, the commissioner of employee relations is an
appointed position.
Labor's formal role in the legislative process is
usually limited to its work on the task force, and in these
cases the task force was a temporary group which disbanded
after completing the study. The inclusion of employees in
the process is important because they are the ones
ultimately affected by comparable worth, and it is the
employees' unions who raised the issue in the first place;
few states have acted on comparable worth without being
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pressured to do so. In addition, the task force tends to
have limited power in that it does not participate in
choosing the consultant to do the job evaluation study. An
outside consultant hired by the state may be beholden to the
interests of the state, which may affect the outcome,
although this does not seem to be the situation in these
case studies.
Collective Bargainin
As with legislation, implementing comparable worth
through direct labor-managment negotiation, at least in the
public sector, often begins with the unions lobbying
politicians to address the issue. Unions can also raise the
issue directly at the bargaining table. This method of
implementation is less dependent on public officials
initiating the process, and more focused on joint labor-
management efforts. In the public sector, elected officials
must approve the final contract, but what distinguishes this
process from the legislative approach is the process of
decision-making.
The relationship between management and labor shapes
how implementation is carried out. By the nature of the
negotiations process, unions participate in deciding how
each step of implementation will proceed. When achieved
through collective bargaining, implementation of comparable
worth usually occurs where there are union locals with large
female membership and where women are in union leadership
positions. For example, Carol Dorty, Vice President of SEIU
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Local 614 in Vacaville, was one of the the most active and
outspoken advocates of comparable worth. In Contra Costa
County, female union shop stewards were the most ardent
proponents of comparable worth. At Yale, the issue was
raised by the clerical and technical union which represents
an overwhelmingly female labor force.
Employees tend to have a more direct role in determining
the make-up and the responsibility of the task force in the
bargaining situations than in the legislative ones. Task
forces in collective bargaining are composed exclusively of
representatives of labor and management, whose
constituencies would be directly affected by the outcome.
San Jose, Contra Costa County, Vacaville, and Yale all had
task forces with equal labor-management representation,
although Yale had a faculty member on the committee to act
as a tie-breaker.
In the collective bargaining process, task forces may
take on a greater role than they do in the legislative
process. In certain situations, notably San Jose and
Vacaville, the task force was responsible for not only
conducting a job evaluation study but for choosing whether
or not an outside consultant would be hired. If the task
force does not have any labor representation, it could
endanger the acceptability of its findings. In Contra Costa
County, where the governing body assigned the Personnel
Department to do the study without first forming a task
force or consulting with the unions, the Department's study
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was not accepted by the unions.
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e job evaluation studies seem to be essential to
legislation, they do not seem to be as critical in
g comparable worth wage increases through
e bargaining. Since job evaluation studies are
tly and time consuming, management can sometimes be
to begin rectifying sex-based wage inequities
them; if the union is strong enough, it can win
e worth 'downpayments' i . e. initial corrections
through the use of union studies. Enough data now exists to
give unions and management a good idea of where underpayment
may be present, even before a detailed study is completed.
(Remick, 1984c, p.101).
The Contra Costa County and Yale cases show how
detailed studies are not always necessary to begin
implementing wage increases. Initial payments were
bargained for and won on the basis of preliminary union
studies of the employers' compensation structure which
exposed the extent of undervaluation of female-dominated
jobs. In other cases, point ranking methods were used to
systematically expose the wage gap. However, it appears
that the size of the wage adjustments will be larger when a
thorough study has been completed. Contra Costa County
workers got substantially smaller wage increases than
workers in the other cases (only a 3% raise to start closing
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a 30% gap).
At both Yale and Contra Costa County, union members
conceded that detailed job evaluation studies would be
needed in the long run in order to identify wage disparities
on a job-by-job basis, especially since both employers
previously used rather arbitrary i.e., implicit rather than
explicit) methods for assigning wages. At Yale, the
university administration paid clerical and technical jobs
by "seat of the pants" comparisons with market surveys
(Chernoff, 1985). The Contra Costa County system was
similar. Realizing that setting up and instituting a bias-
free job evaluation and compensation system takes time,
these unions chose a pragmatic, short term approach: to get
whatever raises could be won given that management was
willing to negotiate some increase on the basis of the
unions' preliminary job evaluation research. In the end,
union contracts at Yale and Contra Costa County included
provisions to establish a joint labor-management committee
to conduct a more thorough comparable worth study. These
studies were to serve as a basis for discussion of
additional wage adjustments in future contract negotiations.
Should disputes between labor and management arise
during collective bargaining, three alternatives exist for
resolving them: mediation, arbitration and strikes. In
attempting to implement comparable worth, these same avenues
for resolving disputes are available for overcoming
management opposition to implementation. While these
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tactics offer no guarantees that management opposition can
be overcome, they seem to have been very effective.
In San Jose, Vacaville, Contra Costa County, and at
Yale, it was agreed at the outset that the parties would
negotiate over what actions to take on the results of the
comparable worth study. When management refused to bargain
over wage changes or if the raises were not satisfactory to
the union, the unions either refused to settle their
contract or (when not prohibited by law) went out on strike.
In San Jose, despite laws prohibiting public employee
unions from striking, workers staged a one day strike when
management refused to address the comparable worth issue and
later went out on a nine-day strike when the city refused to
offer an adequate sum of money to close the wage gap. In
Contra Costa County, when negotiations with the County were
at an impasse the unions staged a "late-in" (with female
workers reporting two hours late for work to demonstrate the
amount of time they provide free to the County). The
female-dominated unions then refused to settle contract
negotiations until the County made initial wage equity
adjustments and guaranteed discussion of future comparable
worth pay increases. At Yale, where negotiations dragged
on for over a year, the union offered to submit the dispute
to arbitration. When the managment refused, the union
decided to go out on strike.
When comparable worth adjustments are bargained, the
pressure tactics of striking and of refusing to sign
contracts seem to have a better chance of actually getting
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initial adjustments than litigation. In Washington, it took
over eight years from the time the original comparable worth
study was done to get initial payments. However, collective
bargaining tactics require a great deal of union solidarity,
which may be difficult to sustain over time. In Contra
Costa County, negotiations lasted fourteen months, and at
Yale they lasted twenty months. In many instances,
management tried in vain to break union solidarity, but were
surprised by the resiliency of the union members. They may
have underestimated the determination of the workers to
stick together. In Contra Costa County, management
attempted to buy off particular union leaders with large pay
increases (Finney,1985), and at Yale the university refused
to submit the negotiations to arbitration (Local 34, 1984).
By resisting management attempts to stop comparable worth
efforts, the unions discovered they actually could affect
new areas of compensation.
Threats to union solidarity can also come from other
workers who might oppose comparable worth because it
threatens their relative status. In Contra Costa County,
male leaders of Local 1, an unaffiliated union local with
roughly half female membership, actually proposed at one
point during the negotiations that the female-dominated
unions drop their comparable worth efforts because of
management threats to reduce the workforce in the face of
budget constraints. The female-dominated unions prevailed
and comparable worth adjustments were won in addition to
across the board increases and without any reductions in the
workforce. In contrast, at Yale and in San Jose, male union
members were actively supportive of the comparable worth
efforts and went out on strike in solidarity with their
union sisters. Such solidarity is not always easy to
achieve.
In collective bargaining once initial comparable worth
money is won, the task force is usually given responsibility
for overseeing long term work on comparable worth. This is
in contrast to the legislative arena where the task force is
short-lived. Under legislation the implementation of
comparable worth standard is legally instituted and usually
carried out by the state personnel office. Wage increases
are subject to legislative approval. Through collective
bargaining the basis for future work--both restructuring the
employer's wage-setting procedure and gaining wage increases
is part of a contractual obligation. and thus it depends on
continual renegotiation. It is then incumbent upon the
unions to maintain constant vigilance and pressure.
However, as long as women continue to be a significant force
within unions, and the wage gap persists, it is likely
unions will continue to fight for comparable worth. (Bell,
1985).
The strength of the collective bargaining process and
the active involvement of union members is that having
fought hard to win comparable worth, many union members are
even more determined to see that the process continues.
Carol Dorty of Vacaville claims that the workers realize how
e1
difficult the process of implementing comparable worth was;
they put much time and effort into achieving it and, having
won, are now willing to fight to keep it. In Contra Costa
County, the unions felt "very powerful" during negotiations
and were very determined to safeguard their hard-won
victories. Achieving comparable worth may require unions to
exert their collective power to win settlements and, in this
way, increase worker empowerment.
Summary
In analyzing these case studies, it is clear that there
are several ways of achieving comparable worth in an
employer's compensation structure. The primary ways are
through collective bargaining and through legislation. Often
these tactics must be combined with others (e.g. litigation)
to overcome political and organizational obstacles. The
choice of tactics depends on the legal, institutional, and
political situation. In some states, such as Washington,
collective bargaining over wages is not sanctioned between
the state and its employees. Legislation or litigation may
be the only route available to achieve pay equity. At the
local level and in the private sector, collective bargaining
is the primary method of implementation.
These cases studies highlight how a concept changes in
the process of being translated into policy. The basic
concept behind the policy is equal pay for jobs of
comparable value based on skill, responsibility, knowledge
and working conditions--but how that translates into actual
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changes in wage-setting varies greatly, as these cases
demonstrate. In some instances comparable worth involved the
total reevaluation of an employer's job and wage structure;
other times wage increases were instituted but it is
uncertain how the employer's compensation system will be
altered over time. The two goals of comparable worth are
to increase wages for jobs done primarily by women and to
reevaluate the standards of equity. While in each case the
proponents of comparable worth try to achieve both, they did
not always accomplish both in the short run.
Regardless, comparable worth must first be accepted as
a legitimate concern in wage setting procedures. Once this
was achieved efforts involved a job evaluation study.
Although a thorough job evaluation must be not be conducted
to initiate wage increases, where one was done the wage
adjustments were larger.
In achieving comparable worth collective bargaining
appears to be a more participatiory form of implementation
than legislation. Workers were included on task forces
which actively reviewed compensation systems whereas fewer
union representatives participated in legislative task
forces. Furthermore, more women workers were involved in
bargaining committees than is usually the case in collective
bargaining. And there was some evidence of strong inter-
union coalition building (e.g. Yale and Contra Costa
County).
Collective bargaining relies on the strength of the
union to put the issue on the negotiating agenda and to
persist in pursuing its implementation in spite of
management opposition. As long as unions need to
organize new women workers and keep those they already have,
comparable worth will probably stay a priority for female-
dominated locals. Legislation relies more on the efforts of
interest groups exerting pressure on elected officials and
on the efforts of politicians to then follow through. As
long as legislators need to court votes and seek to avoid
the high costs of the government being sued for
discrimination, they may be expected to maintain some
interest in achieving comparable worth. (Remick, 1984b).
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Chapter 5: LIMITiTIONS OF COMPARABLE WORTH IMPLEMENTiTION
Comparable worth is a policy designed as an outgrowth
of equal employment policy. Its aim is to achieve pay equity
adjustments for undervalued female-dominated jobs within a
work organization by redefining standards of equity. In
this thesis I have examined how comparable worth had been
implemented in five states and localities, and one private
sector organization. These comparable worth efforts were
carried out mainly through legislation and collective
bargaining.
In each case, some type of job evaluation method was
used by employers and employees to show that a wage gap
existed between dissimlar., yet comparable male and female
jobs. Despite the variety of methods, most studies revealed
a wage gap of roughly 15-20%. In an effort to begin
correcting for this wage inequity, employers allotted some
money to raise the salaries of workers in the underpaid job
categories. However, while these initial "pay equity"
adjustments only partially closed the gap, future
adjustments were expected to narrow the wage differential
further. Though implementing comparable worth involves
technical questions of how to measure and assess sex-bias in
compensation, these cases demonstrate that achieving
comparable worth is not only a technical issue but a
political and economic one as well.
These implementation efforts represent an early stage
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of implementation. In every instance money was paid out to
rectify past inequities in the compensation of female-
dominated jobs. But the attempt to redefine standards of
equity was circumscribed in three ways. First, in each
instance the sogge of comparable worth was limited to a
particular set(s) of jobs. No employer applied the job
evaluation system to all jobs within the organization.
Second, while comparable worth standards were applied to
each employers' compensation system, no settlement included
explicit guarantees that the evaluation methods would be
reevaluated over time to incorporate changing job
requirements and changing values of worth. Finally, where
job evaluation was used to identify wage discrimination, the
job evaluation scheme was never significantly altered in
order to identify sex-bias in the description of jobs and
the choice of compensable factors. It may take many more
years experience to assess whether comparable worth mandated
in law or in contract can expand to meet these conditions.
Each of these will be discussed in detail below.
qgge of Study
One of the ways in which the use of job evaluation can
be discriminatory is when an employer uses different job
evaluation plans to assess different jobs classes within the
firm. Since job categories covered by different plans tend
to be highly sex-segregated, the ability to assess sex
discrimination in compensation requires the ability to
compare jobs among, as well as within, plans. Restricting
the scope of comparable worth comparisons may lead to the
(6
underestimation of the value of female-dominated jobs,
particularly if the excluded jobs are highly-paid, male-
typed jobs to which female jobs could theoretically be
compared. The use of separate systems may only serve to
reinforce historical sex-bias.
Many employers have justified the use of separate
evaluation plans arguing that the vastly different nature of
jobs requires the use of different evaluation schemes.
Despite seemingly large differences in job requirements, one
evaluation plan can be used to evaluate a variety of jobs.
For example, the U.S. Department of Labor's Dictionary of
Ogcggtional Titles uses one set of consistent factors to
assess over 35,000 jobs (Beatty and Beatty, 1984, p.63;
Treiman and Hartmann, 1981, p.79). This guide has been the
basis for the development of single evaluation plans for
many large firms, and many state and local governments.
While the use of a single plan is technically possible,
it was done in only one of these comparable worth cases.
Every comparable worth study, except one, excluded
management positions. In Contra Costa County, where
management positions were reviewed, the job evaluation study
was only a preliminary one; it remains to be seen whether
or not management positions will be included in the long run
as the joint labor-management committee undertakes a more
thorough evaluation of the County's pay system.
While comparable worth studies have excluded management
jobs, it is unclear why they did so. Management is not a
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monolithic job category and usually has its own internal
hierarchy of jobs. Lower level management positions may
actually be comparable to higher level non-management
positions (e.g. executive secretary or administrative
assistant) on the basis of job content and requirements. In
most instances the distinguishing characteristic between
management and non-managements level jobs is the rate of pay
(both in terms of wages and benefits) and the way those pay
scales are determined.
Getting management level positions included in
comparable worth studies may be difficult given the
reluctance of workers to give up their relatively privileged
position. In Minnesota, many lower level management
employees now find that the workers they supervise actually
make as much, and sometimes more, than they do. They have
expressed their discontent, but management has not yet
decided how and if they will address these concerns. In the
cases reviewed, salaries may, by law, not be downgraded to
rectify inequities. Still, comparable worth has the
potential to alter the historical wage differential between
management and non-management workers from which the former
have, in part, derived their relatively higher status.
It may be easier politically, however, to extend the
scope of comparable worth to include all non-management
positions than to include management. Legislation may
offer a particular advantage over the collective bargaining
process in its ability to extend the scope of comparable
worth standards. If the governor or legislature agrees to
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review the government's compensation procedure, it may have
the legal power, through civil service laws which supercede
collective bargaining laws (Dean, 1984), to make the system
inclusive of all non-management jobs and bargaining units.
This allows for broad intra-unit comparison. In Minnesota
and Washington, all non-management employees were on the
same general classification system prior to the
implementation of comparable worth. Consequently, when the
comparable worth study was done, it was possible to evaluate
and compare a
At the
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difficult to
on the same
systems exist
to fund "cri
police' wages
However,
large cross-section of dissimilar jobs.
bargaining table, employers may deal with
ts on an individual basis, thus it may be more
get all jobs within an organization evaluated
basis. Sometimes, different compensation
because separate pools of money are set aside
tical" positions, i.e., firefighters' and
in San Jose and Contra Costa County.
these excluded units are often male-dominated
and higher paid. While often supportive of the comparable
worth efforts of female-dominated units, these male
unionists may be uninterested in participating in comparable
worth studies because of fear of losing their relative
bargaining strength. Many such units bargain with
management separately and are able to secure higher
salaries; participating in comparable worth could compromise
this advantage. Further, they may fear that management
will downscale their wages in order to correct wage
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inequities. The cases suggest that prohibitions against
downscaling of wages can be successful; comparable worth
adjustments were awarded on top of standard, across-the-
board wage increases. Comparable worth may bring about a
major change in the relative salaries of these jobs, and
similar to management workers, the male-dominated unions may
resist any attempt to challenge the status quo.
When the unions excluded from comparable worth studies
are either male-dominated or higher paid, comparable worth
can only achieve limited success. In these cases, the
amount of money awarded partially closed the wage gap
between male and female jobs but the establishment of a
bias-free standard of equity was limited by the exclusion of
certain workers. Getting excluded units and management
included in the process may depend upon two factors: the
relative strength of the workers in underpaid female-
dominated jobs and the nature of the classification system
previously used by the employer. Perhaps more difficult may
be the cultural problem of getting workers, particularly
underpaid female employees, to understand that their jobs
maybe comparable to other, quite dissimilar jobs. Women
workers often see their jobs in relation to other female
jobs, and not in relation to higher paid male jobs. (Newman,
1976). "Unfortunately, since women are not only
workers...but also participants in the culture at large,
they often share the undervaluation of women's work, whether
done by themselves or other women." (Remick, 1984, p.91)
(9()
Relevant Evaluation Methods
Once comparable jobs are evaluated and wages realigned
to reflect relative job value it does not guarantee non-
discrimination over time. To do this a mechanism should be
set up to ensure that discriminatory wage differences do not
reappear. When a new job evalaution method is put in place
as part of an effort to achieve comparable worth, it should
be updated over time to reflect changes in job structure and
changes in what an employer values. Remick (1984) states,
"job evaluation systems and prevailing wages are
based on cultural value systems that are forever
changing, a perfect evluation system, good for all
time is impossible."
Historically job evaluation systems were developed for
private sector, manufacturing firms. Later, systems were
developd for office jobs. Designers of these systems
tended, however, to borrow factors from previously designed
systems, so that the new systems reflected their industrial
origins. Over time job content and skill requirements have
changed. In addition, the societal view of the relative
importance of certain jobs has changed. Many existing
plans, therefore, may not correspond to the current nature
of the labor market. Today's workforce is concentrated in
technical and service jobs--jobs held by many women.
Revised evaluation plans may be needed which consider the
full range of skills demanded and credit them in accordance
with their value to an organization's operations. (Treiman
and Hartmann, 1981).
Evaluation systems must be continually updated in order
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to incorporate the changing content of jobs and to reflect
changes in what an employer values. For example, over time
the nature of what is important to an employer has changed.
Employers in highly product-oriented organiztions may
require and value manual tasks such as lifting and operating
heavy machinery. Many of today's industries, though, are
more service-oriented and rely on employees being able to
operate light machinery (data processors; calculators) and
to interact well with the public. This is particularly
relevant for women, many of whom are employed in service
sector jobs and whose jobs skills may not be well defined in
manufacturing-based job evaluations. Job evaluation systems
need to reflect these changes.
Through legislation, the responsibilty for updating
comparable worth is with state personnel office and open to
high degree of political intervention. Through collective
bargaining the task force may be charged with this task,
allowing for a greater level of worker input. This may be
important because it is workers who know what their jobs
require and may be able to best assess how job content is
changing.
Sex-Bias in Job Evaluation
Steinberg (1984) writes that comparable worth policy
addresses the issue of wage discrimination which exists
"where there is an inconsistent application of values or an
inappropriate assessment of jobs" (p.22). Thus far the
emphasis of comparable worth activity has been on the
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former.
Although in some cases minor alterations were made to
job job evaluation techniques, in none of the case studies
did employers and employees attempt to significantly alter
what aspects of jobs were given most weight by job
evaluation techniques. Rather, comparable worth proponents
were more concerned with getting higher wages for women.
Reestablishing equity standards to reflect comparable worth
was the tool used to obtain these wage increases. Making
the job evaluation system as bias-free as possible was
considered to be a separate goal, part of a more long term
project (Bonnie Watkins, 1985; Lee Finney, 1985; Chernoff,
1985). Designing a new system takes time and may be costly.
The comparable worth advocates in these cases realized that
while current job evaluation methods may underestimate the
extent of the gap, they can still help reduce discriminatory
differences in the pay of jobs done primarily by men and
those done primarily by women. (Treiman and Hartmann, 1981,
p. 81).
There are two potential sources of sex-bias in
evaluation systems: job evaluators may incorporate cultural
stereotypes and prejudice in describing work traditionally
done by men and work traditionally done by women; and the
compensable factors chosen to evaluate jobs may be
reflective of cultural bias. Because the evaluation process
is inherently a judgmental one, a totally bias-free job
evaluation system does not exist. However, if these
evaluation systems were more closely scrutinized for sex-
bias, they could possilby identify an even larger wage gap
between male and female-dominated jobs and set new standards
for what is a fair and equitable wage.
For example, the nurturing and guidance skills required
of nurses and teachers (both female-doinated occupations)
may be considered intrinsic qualities of women rather than
skills required to perform jobs effectively. Consequently
they may go unnoticed by job evaluators. Ironically, while
men may be rewarded for the things they are assumed to do
better "naturally" (i.e., lifting heavy objects), women
often recieve little or no compensation for their "natural"
talents (i.e., nurturing or counseling). Even if evaluators
are sensitive to these biases, prevailing patriarchal views
which underlie the undervalution of women's work may be hard
to detect. For example, many evaluation systems measure
responsibility in fiscal terms. Many women's occupations
carry a great deal of responsibility--but for people not for
money (day-care workers, nurses, social workers), and thus
these responsibilities may be overlooked and undervalued.
Under the legislative process in Minnesota and
Washington, the choice of consultant (who in turns chooses
the factors of evaluation) was in the hands of the governor.
When the employer chooses the system they must be careful to
watch for bias becuase they can be held resonsible for any
biases in their compensation system. The collective
bargaining procedures puts the task force in charge of
making the choice. For example, in Vacaville, the task
force carefully reviewed several studies to choose one which
best met their needs. While not certain to eliminate sex-
bias, allowing the unions to help chose the system (whether
in the legislation or collective bargaining process) may
insure a higher level of acceptability of the results.
One way to get a less-biased system is to design a job
evaluation system which looks at what the standard of
evaluation has been historically (based on white male
related tasks) and to evaluate all jobs based on that
standard. This is what is being done in New York state,
where workers bargained for a the development of a new job
evaluation methodology. (Cook, 1984). The New York study
asks workers to describe their jobs. Realizing that workers
might describe what they think others consider valuable, the
designers of the study have developed a new rating scheme
for workers to use in evaluating their jobs, which includes
job factors that may have been undervalued or disregarded in
the past. As with other reforms, there are tradeoffs between
achieving short run goals (obtaining more money for women)
and long run goals (creating a less-biased standard of
equity). If short term goals are pursued, it may be at the
expense of the long run goals--management may realize that
paying workers based on a consistent application of
standards is cheaper than developing and instituting a more
bias-free system.
There are no definitive tests of what constitute
"fairness" in choosing factors. Treiman and Hartmann (1981)
conclude fairness in this context can only mean "achieving a
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consensus about factors and their weights among employers
and employees." Whether through collective bargaining or
legislation employees should be included because they are
the ones most affected by the job evaluations.
Chapter 6: CONCLUSION
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate how the
policy of comparable worth--equal pay for work of equal
value--has been implemented. The wage differential between
men and women is now widely recognized, as is the fact that
the workforce is highly sex-segregated. Recent research
supports the assertion that the two are significantly
correlated. Disagreements exist, however, over the exact
nature of the linkage. Comparable worth advocates claim
that "women's work" is undervalued simply because it is done
by women. Feminists and unions have advocated comparable
worth as one policy which could potentially alleviate a
large portion of the wage gap by rewarding women fairly for
the work they do. Economists continue to argue over the
evidence supporting comparable worth and private sector
employers oppose it (Livernash, 1980), yet implementation of
comparable worth has been widespread in the public sector.
In this thesis I have reviewed the efforts of womens'
groups and unions to implement comparable worth through
collective bargaining and legislation. Legislation relies
to a great extent on the support of politicians in power.
Legislating comparable worth makes the policy a legal
responsibility of the state. As an employer of a large
number of workers in a diverse group of occupations, the
state can apply the policy to a broad set of jobs. The
example set by the state has the potential to influence
other employers.' The spillover effect from implementation
of comparable worth in the public sector, or by one large
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employer in an area, onto other employers is something which
has yet to be studied empirically.
While legislation can be effective, it is subject to
significant political scrutiny which can make implementation
a long, sometimes fruitless, process. In Minnesota, where
implementation has been achieved relatively easily and at a
relatively low cost to the state, there is an historically
strong union environment and a commitment to progressive
political issues. The Washington case exemplifies the
opposite extreme--where union and women's groups had to
struggle with a changing political environment and
increasing resistance to implementation within the state
legislature and governorship. In both Minnesota and
Washington, the workers, through their unions served
primarily as a lobbying force to get elected officials to
institute changes in their wage-setting procedures.
On the other hand, when comparable worth is
implemented through collective bargaining it appears to
offer a greater degree of employee input in the entire
process. As a direct result of labor-management
negotiations comparable worth has been interpreted in a
variety of ways. Most significant is that through
collective bargaining a job evaluation study is not always
necessary to begin implementation. Regardless of the
details of implementation, once raised as a legitimate issue
at the bargaining table comparable worth can expand the
areas of employee input in wage setting practices. The
collective bargaining cases of San Jose, Contra Costa
County, Vacaville, and Yale show how workers were more
involved in job evaluations studies, negotiating
committeees, and oversight for ongoing implementation than
when instituted through legislative procedures.
This worker participation has led to greater worker
empowerment. Using their collective strength, workers have
gone on strike or fought contract settlements until their
comparable worth demands were addressed by management;
women workers have been able to have their concerns
addressed. In the years to come it will be important to see
if this new found power can be effective in achieving
further implementation of comparable worth as well as other
issues of concern to women workers, such as childcare or
part-time employment.
Despite the differences in approaches, both collective
bargaining and legislation have been effective in winning
higher wages for workers in female-dominated job categories.
These wage adjustments are different from wage realignments
that simply raise the pay of the lowest level jobs and
collapse an employer's wage structure. In these cases wage
adjustments went to all undervalued job classes not just
the lowest paid jobs at the bottom of the wage scale. Jobs
at the bottom of the wage scale are often disproportionately
undervalued, and primarily filled by women, therefore, they
are likely to receive a larger percentage of comparable
worth adjustments. Thus, in closing the discriminatory gap
between male- and female-typed jobs, comparable worth may
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also collapse the overall wage structure.
In theory, comparable worth requires that there be
fairness (consistency) in the application of job evaluation
methods for ranking jobs and setting salaries. It also
requires that there be a revaluation of women's work through
a recognition of the tasks of jobs performed by women as
distinct from the skills of the job incumbents. In
practice, comparable worth does not always accomplish both
of these goals simultaneously or completely. In fact, these
case studies clearly indicate that the emphasis of
comparable worth activity has been on the former. While
proponents of comparable worth may recognize the
desirability of achieving both goals, the pragmatic approach
has been to achieve fairness and win wage increases in
whatever way possible, and promote further revaluation of
job evaluation methods as part of the longer term, ongoing
process.
Still, much remains to be done in defining equity based
on the standard of comparable worth. Comparable worth has
been interpreted and implemented in a limited fashion.
Expanding the scope of comparable worth to include the
widest distribution of jobs and developing ways of
identifying and eliminating sex-bias in job evaluation
methods may eventually lead to the full elimination of sex-
based discrimination in wage setting practices.
The implementation of comparable worth can begin to
challenge cultural beliefs which undervalue women's work and
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economic practices which exploit women by not paying them a
wage which accurately reflects their contribution to an
employer's operation. In doing so comparable worth may not
only raise women's wage but also has the potential of
initiating a more open discusion of the wage system within a
firm. Since wages are influenced by how one perceives work
and who does it, comparable worth by raising women's wages
can raise the societal value of women's work and change Yet,
one policy alone will not be enough to overcome major social
inequities. Comparable worth must be part of a broader
social justice program.
It is too early to draw any definitive conclusions on
how much of the wage gap comparable worth will be able to
eliminate, but it is clear that when applied it can reduce
some of the discriminatory differences in the pay of men's
and women's jobs. Economic forecasts indicate that during
the next few decades sex-segregated occupations will
continue to grow rapidly. Consequently, many researchers
(Blau, 1984; Walker and Grune, 1984) believe that the wage
gap between men and women is likely to remain relatively
unchanged. Consistently applying job evaluation standards
can begin to reduce that gap. Revaluating what it is
employers and society values about work can close the gap
even further, but this struggle will not be accomplished
very easily or very quickly.
The recent rapid increase in the number of women
living in poverty only heightens the urgency of achieving
economic equity for women. The immediate economic interests
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of women dictate that wage increases be won in the short
run; and that the struggle to restructure wage scales be
part of long term goals. The fact that comparable worth is
never fully accomplished all at once, underscores the need
for establishing a long term institutionalized process for
handling comparable worth as part of any comparable worth
policy.
Comparable worth is one policy intervention which could
significantly alter the wage earning power of women. It can
also begin to alter cultural perceptions of the value of
women's contribution to the economy and lessen women's
economic dependence on men's wages. Action is widespread
and growing. Employers both in the public and private
sector can no longer avoid the issue. If the concept is to
spread, it will require workers to organize to exert
pressure on employers to implement it either voluntarily or
through collective bargaining, legislation, or litigation.
"As more firms adopt comparable worth, the
resultant salary adjustments will permeate the
wage structure of local labor markets. Through
the process of pressure, innvovation, imitation,
and adjustment, the wages paid for work done
primarily by women will catch up with the
reality that women represent a large, permanent,
and highly productive set of employees. These
concrete actions will, no doubt, eventually
transform a highly charged and controversial
political demand into a routine and
institutionalized feature of equal employment
policy." (Remick and Steinberg, 1984, p. 301.)
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